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Comments
INTERNET INDECENCY AND IMPRESSIONABLE MINDS
I. INTRODUCrION
Recently, the debate between the value of robust free speech and pro-
tecting the impressionable minds of the nation's youth has been ex-
panding to cover technological advances in methods of communication.
1
For example, the Communications Decency Act ("CDA") 2 and ensuing lit-
igation have provided a platform for the controversy surrounding Internet
technologies and the impact they may have on children.3 Despite the con-
troversy between protecting children or allowing them legitimate access to
1. See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (holding that stat-
ute relating to detention and destruction of unsealed mail containing communist
political propaganda was unconstitutional and "at war with the 'uninhibited inde-
cency is imprecise. One distinction, however, is that no federal court has defined
indecent speech. Similarly, the CDA has not provided any definition of indecent
speech. The Federal Communications Commission in, robust, and wide-open'"
debate that First Amendment contemplates); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557, 564 (1969) (upholding right to privacy in one's home and noting "right to
receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth... is fundamental
to our free society").
The Supreme Court has articulated positions that support the protection of
children argument. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (noting Supreme
Court has "repeatedly recognized the governmental interest in protecting children
from harmful materials"); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1977) (not-
ing Supreme Court may prohibit forms of availability of offensive and indecent
speech to children); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 63940 (1968) (noting
that government's interest in its children's well-being may justify restrictions on
offensive speech).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1460 (1994).
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 1460 (1994) (prohibiting "knowingly sell[ing] or pos-
sess[ing] with intent to sell an obscene visual depiction, [which is punishable] by a
fine in accordance with the provisions of this title or imprison[ment] for not more
than [two] years or both"); 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (Supp. III 1997) (prohibiting trans-
mission of indecent speech). Section 223(b) prohibits:
(1) in interstate or foreign communications-(A) by means of a telecom-
munications device knowingly-(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and (ii) ini-
tiates the transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal,
image, or other communication which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
or indecent, with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass another per-
son; (B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly-(i) makes,
creates or solicits, and (ii) initiates the transmission of, any comment,
request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is
obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the communication is
under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the maker of such communi-
cation placed the call or initiated the communication.
Id.; see 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (Supp. III 1997). Section 223(d) prohibits:
whoever (1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly-
(745)
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necessary information, little attention has been given to the actual impact
indecent speech may have on children.4 Although political rhetoric sur-
rounding obscenity and indecency blends the two concepts, both the legal
and scientific ramifications of each type of speech are distinct.5 For in-
stance, the literature on pornography indicates that sexually violent
(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person
or persons under 18 years of age, or (B) uses any interactive com-
puter service to display in a manner available to a person under 18
years of age, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or
other communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community stan-
dards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether
the user of such service placed the call or initiated the
communication.
47 U.S.C. § 223(d); see 47 U.S.C. § 223(e) (Supp. III 1997) (qualifying CDA by
allowing two affirmative defenses, subsection (5)(A), which covers those who take
"good faith, reasonable, effective and appropriate actions to restrict.., access to
minors," and subsection (5) (B), which covers those who restrict access to covered
materials by requiring proof of age such as verified credit card, adult identification
number or code); Reno, 521 U.S. at 860 (noting protections of affirmative defenses
for good faith restrictions and use of designated restriction mechanisms such as
credit cards or identification numbers).
4. See Protecting Children from Computer Pornography Act: Cyberporn and Children:
Hearings on S. 892 Before Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 1 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter Cyberporn] (opening statement of Hon. Charles E. Grassley, Iowa) ("Fundamen-
tally, the controversy this committee faces today is about how much protection we
are willing to extend to children."). Senator Grassley discusses how playgrounds
are hunting grounds for child molesters and how, teenage pregnancy and teen
drug use has increased:
Until very recently, parents could breathe a little easier in their own
homes. After all, the home is supposed to be safe and is supposed to be a
barrier between your children and the dark forces which seek to corrupt
and destroy our youth. But enter the internet and other computer net-
works. Suddenly, now not even the home is safe. Now the dark forces
which were once stopped by the front door have found their way into the
home through personal computers.
Id. But see id. at 33 (statement of Hon. Russell D. Feingold, Wisconsin) (noting
that although protecting children is most important challenge Internet poses, Sen-
ator expressed concern that "discussion has become so sensationalized that Con-
gress may 'fail to react appropriately'"); see also ACLU v. Reno, No. 96-CV-963,
available in 1996 WL 929618, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 1996) (Complaint) [hereinaf-
ter Complaint] (presenting examples of organizations that post information bene-
ficial to children). For example, the organization Stop Prisoner Rape alleged that:
[M]inors do access its web site, and believes it is essential to allow this
access to continue. Minors are among the victims of prisoner rape and
are in fact well-known and abundantly described in published literature
on the subject to be particularly singled out as targets for sexual assault
precisely because of their youth.
Id. at *17.
5. See Kelly M. Doherty, WWW Obscenity. Com: An Analysis of Obscenity and Inde-
cency Regulation on the Internet, 32 AKRON L. REv. 259, 266 (1999) (stating obscene
language is not subject to constitutional protection but indecent language is con-
stitutionally protected and subject to strict scrutiny).
[Vol. 44: p. 745
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images and child pornography may be harmful, whereas nudity is not
harmful per se.
6
Children can and do understand what they perceive in the media.
7
But in some instances, sexually explicit information that would be charac-
6. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 (1975) (stating not
all nudity is obscene and citing as examples of non-obscene nudity a bare baby's
buttocks and scenes from movies in societies where nudity is indigenous); Gins-
berg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 634-35 (1968) (stating pictures of nudity are not
obscene to adults but are to minors). But see Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 629 (concluding
moral and social well being of minors justify regulation of sexually explicit mate-
rial). Freedom of speech proponents argue to limit regulation of indecency. See
Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Edwards,
C.J., dissenting in part) (noting that Commission's orders implementing Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 governing indecent
and obscene programming violated First Amendment liberties and stating that "in
focusing on indecency... Congress has addressed a 'problem' that has yet to be
shown to have any harmful effects," in comparison with violence in media, which
Senator asserts is harmful). In Alliance, television access programers challenged
FCC orders implementing the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Compe-
tition Act governing indecent and obscene programming. See id. at 105. The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the
Act requiring segregating and blocking indecent programing was the least restric-
tive means of achieving the government's interest in limiting children's access to
indecent programing. See id. at 111 (discussing § 10 of Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act as least restrictive way to implement Congres-
sional intent "to limit the access of children to indecent programming"); see also
Cyberporn, supra note 4, at 7 (opening statement of Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, Ver-
mont) (noting that "when the problem of children's access to objectionable on-
line material first came up for a vote ... the Senate acted without the benefit of
hearings or anything approaching the thorough examination of the matter that
you have set out"); id. at 11 (prepared statement of Sen. Leahy) ("I am old fash-
ioned enough to remember when we used to hold hearings first and pass legisla-
tion after-after we got the facts, had analyzed the problem and had worked with
the Administration and the public to craft a legislative solution to the public's
legitimate concerns.").
Little empirical information has addressed the effect of pornography on chil-
dren. See 27 THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY
(1970) [hereinafer JOHNSON COMMISSION] ("In sum, empirical research designed
to clarify the question has found no evidence to date that exposure to explicit
sexual materials plays a significant role in the causation of delinquent or criminal
behavior among youth or adults."). For a further discussion of the findings of the
Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, see infra notes 74-169 and ac-
companying text.
7. See DANIEL R. ANDERSON & PATRICIA A. COLLINS, THE IMPACT ON CHILDREN'S
EDUCATION: TELEVISION'S INFLUENCE ON COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 3-5 (1988) (find-
ing "children are cognitively active during television viewing and attempt to form a
coherent, connected understanding of television programs"); JENNINGS BRYANT &
DANIEL R. ANDERSON, CHILDREN'S UNDERSTANDING OF TELEVISION: RESEARCH ON
ATrENTION AND COMPREHENSION P6 (1983) (presenting research indicating chil-
dren comprehend television programs); BRIAN R. CLIFFORD ET AL., TELEVISION AND
CHILDREN: PROGRAM EVALUATION, COMPREHENSION AND IMPACT 202 (1995) (con-
cluding that after researching children's viewing of drama, science and quiz shows,
there is little evidence that "the greatest part of adult-oriented television viewed by
children 'goes over their heads'"). See generally JUDITH VAN EvRA, TELEVISION AND
CHILD DEVELOPMENT 43-51 (1998) (comparing children's understanding of televi-
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terized as indecent under the CDA or similar state statutes can be helpful
to and educational for children. 8 The problem is, most protectionist rhet-
oric provides examples of obscene speech while arguing to restrict both
obscene and indecent speech. 9 Whether children are harmed by indecent
speech or benefit from the availability of information that could be la-
beled indecent has not, however, been systemically evaluated. 10
Clearly, both children and parents have the right to be free from gov-
ernmental regulation of speech that is not harmful; therefore, because the
CDA also prohibits harmless speech, it is not appropriate." To support
this position, Part II of this Comment traces the background of the free
speech obscenity debate through the development of the concept of inde-
cent speech, noting the important differences between indecent speech
and obscenity and culminating in a discussion of Reno v. ACLU.12 Part III
discusses the scientific literature on the effects of pornography and dem-
onstrates that governmental limitations on pornography should be cir-
sion, print and radio and finding children attend to and retain different informa-
tion from each medium).
8. See Reno, 521 U.S. 878 (noting that some parents may choose to use In-
ternet to inform their children about birth control or other information parent
finds appropriate). For a discussion of the educational benefits that sexually ex-
plicit information provides, see infra notes 143-165 and accompanying text.
9. See 141 CONG. REc. S8328-30 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Exon) (defending CDA as necessary to protect children by citing examples of hard
core pornography, bestiality and child pornography). "[I]t is not exaggeration to
say that the most disgusting, repulsive pornography is only a few clicks away from
any child with a computer." Id.
10. See, e.g., Reno, 521 U.S. 875 (discussing analogy to Sable Communications of
Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989), that "mere fact that a statutory regulation of
speech was enacted for the important purpose of protecting children from expo-
sure to sexually explicit material does not foreclose inquiry into its validity"). The
Court stated:
[T]he Congressional record presented to use contains no evidence as to
how effective or ineffective the FCC's most recent regulation might prove
to be .... No Congressman or Senator purported to present a considered
judgment with respect to how often or to what extent minors could or
would circumvent the rules and have access to dial-a-porn messages.
Id. at 877.
11. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 866 (distinguishing CDA from statute at issue in Gins-
berg in that parents could purchase magazines at issue in Ginsberg for their children
if parents so chose); ACLUv. Reno, No. 96-CV-963, 1996 WL 929618, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 8, 1996) (alleging that CDA violates First Amendment rights, criminalizes pri-
vate "e-mail" correspondence for individuals under 18 years, deems correspon-
dence "patently offensive or indecent," prohibits anonymous speech on vast
portions of computer networks and criminalizes protected distribution of informa-
tion related to abortion).
12. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 844 (1997) (involving suit based on pro-
posed restrictions of indecent speech on Internet via CDA).
[Vol. 44: p. 745
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cumscribed to the two forms that are harmful. 13 Finally, Part IV discusses
parental guidance as an alternative to governmental control.
14
II. BACKGROUND
A. Why Free Speech is Important in a Democracy
The First Amendment guarantees freedom of speech, declaring "Con-
gress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech."15 The
Framers made such a guarantee, not to protect the popular opinion, but
rather to acquiesce people's natural tendency to form factions and to pro-
tect the opinions of those not in power. 16 Rather than governmental au-
thority limiting speech and the ideas of the populace, the marketplace of
ideas was viewed as the appropriate method for determining which ideas
were worthy of sustained attention. 17 Not only were unpopular views to be
protected, but the Supreme Court later noted that "a principal function of
free speech under our system of government [was] to invite dispute. [Free
speech] best serve[s] its high purpose when it induces a condition of
unrest. "18
The First Amendment also protects children. 19 Although such pro-
tection is more limited than for adults, children have affirmative First
Amendment rights that the government may not completely abridge.
2 0
13. For a discussion of the scientific literature, see infra notes 74-169 and ac-
companying text.
14. For a discussion of parental guidance as an alternative to governmental
control, see infra notes 172-200 and accompanying text.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 58 (James A. Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) (noting "latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man").
17. SeeAbrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing) (stating "ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the com-
petition of the market").
18. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408 (1989) (discussing flag burning as
expressive conduct deserving First Amendment protection).
19. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-
11 (1969) (concluding that students' political speech, which involved wearing
black arm bands in protest of Vietnam war, was permissible). The Court held that
schools may limit children's freedom of speech because the speech at issue did not
substantially disrupt or materially interfere with school activities. See id. at 509.
20. See id. at 505 (holding that speech is entitled to comprehensive protection
under First Amendment and "First Amendment rights, applied in light of the spe-
cial characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and
students").
The rights afforded children in Tinker were somewhat diminished by the lan-
guage in Hazelwood School District v. Kulmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). In Hazelwood, the
school district censored articles written by students in the school newspaper. See id.
at 262. The Court noted that such censorship was permissible because a school
newspaper was fairly characterized as part of the school curriculum and the school-
sponsored activities were "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."
Id. at 273. Children have been afforded diminished rights to free speech under
the theory that their "minds and values are still developing," and therefore should
1999]
5
Witte: Internet Indecency and Impressionable Minds
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
The government may restrict dissemination of protected materials to chil-
dren only in narrow and well-defined circumstances.2 1 Children retain
the right not only to political and other speech, but to experience forms of
speech that may be offensive, and or, bordering on obscene.
22
B. The Evolution of Obscenity
Obscenity law is rooted in the protection afforded in the First Amend-
ment; however, First Amendment protection is not absolute.2 3 Certain
categories of speech, including obscenity, are outside the scope ofjudicial
protection. 2 4 In 1972, the Supreme Court set forth the modern test for
be protected and guided. Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of the Lou-
doun County Library, 2 F. Supp. 2d 783, 795 (E.D. Va. 1998).
21. See Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 (1975) (noting that
government may bar public dissemination of protected materials to minors in nar-
row circumstances); Rabeck v. New York, 391 U.S. 462, 462 (1968) (striking uncon-
stitutionally vague ordinance prohibiting sale of "girlie" magazines to children,
noting it was no defense to say ordinance "was adopted for the salutary purpose of
protecting children"); Interstate Circuit Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 681-82
(1968) (striking unconstitutionally vague ordinance prohibiting display of "not-
suitable" films without prior permission despite justification of protecting
children).
22. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977) (noting that
"fact that protected speech may be offensive to some does not justify its suppres-
sion"); Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 213 (holding that all films containing nudity cannot
be deemed obscene as to minors); see also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512-13 (stating chil-
dren may express opinions whether in classroom, cafeteria or playing field, "even
on controversial subjects").
23. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I (establishing right to free speech); see also
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 190 (1964) (noting obscenity cases involve rights
derived from First Amendment guarantees of free expression, therefore, Court
must make case-by -case analysis to determine whether material in question is con-
stitutionally protected).
24. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383-88 (1992) (stating that
"obscenity has no constitutional protection, and government may ban it outright
in certain media"); Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124 (1989) (not-
ing Court has "repeatedly held that the protection of the First Amendment does
not extend to obscene speech"); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 751 (1977)
(holding that FCC has power to regulate radio broadcast that is indecent, though
not obscene); Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 209 (noting that government may selectively
shield public from forms of speech on grounds that speech is offensive, but such
censorship is restricted by First Amendment); Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 57 (1973) (holding that in long stretch of Supreme Court's history, ob-
scenity laws may be used to enforce "primary requirements of decency"); see also
Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119 (1973) (affirming that graphic, explicit
written description of sexual contact absent photograph or illustration constituted
obscenity, which receives no First Amendment protection); Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87, 118 (1973) (holding that definition of obscenity is legal term of
art, giving notice to purveyors of obscene material that their conduct is proscribed
by law); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 635 (1968) ("Obscenity is not within
the area of protected speech .... ); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 188 (1964)
(noting that only obscenity is excluded from constitutional protection, therefore,
issue of whether French film, "The Lovers," was obscene was necessarily one of
constitutional law); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152 (1959) (reiterating that
Constitution does not protect obscene speech and materials in suit where Court
750 [Vol. 44: p. 745
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determining what constitutes obscenity in Miller v. California.25 This test
requires that an:
[A]verage person, applying contemporary community standards
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the pruri-
ent interest, whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applica-
ble state law, and whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks seri-
ous literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
2 6
As a result of the Miller test, obscenity law has been applied to books, films,
radio, telephone and, most recently, the Internet.
2 7
In determining what material is obscene, the Court has concluded,
however, that what is obscene for children is not necessarily obscene for
adults. 28 For example, in Ginsberg v. New York,29 although appellant was
convicted of selling "girlie" magazines to a sixteen-year-old boy, in viola-
tion of a New York penal law, he had a constitutional right to sell the
material to adults. 30 The New York law constitutionally defined material
as obscene for persons under the age of seventeen, however, this same
overturned conviction of bookseller for possession of obscene material because
bookseller conceded knowledge that material was obscene); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 497-98 (1957) (holding obscene materials are not constitutionally
protected).
25. 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (setting forth new test for determining if material is
obscene). In Miller, the Court firmly established that the community standard
component of the obscenity definition, which Judge Learned Hand had previously
developed in United States v. Kennerley, would remain a part of the modern defini-
tion of obscenity. See United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. Supp. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913)
(noting that "to put thought in leash to the average conscience of the time is per-
haps tolerable, but to fetter it by the necessities of the lowest and least capable
seems a fatal policy"); see also Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. Prior to adopting the Miller
test, the Court also expressly rejected the "utterly without redeeming social value"
standard articulated in Memoirs v. Massachusetts. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383
U.S. 413, 419 (1966) (plurality opinion) (interpreting social importance test, not-
ing book need not be "unqualifiedly worthless" to be determined to be obscene).
26. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-25.
27. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 844 (1997) (discussing regulation of ob-
scene and indecent speech on Internet); Sable, 492 U.S. at 115-116 (discussing reg-
ulations of Dial-A-Porn services); Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 738-40 (concluding indecent
language was used in broadcast); Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 205 (discussing Florida
statute prohibiting display of nudity in motion pictures at drive-ins); Memoirs, 383
U.S. at 418 (discussing action against book about life of prostitute).
28. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 637-43 (discussing rationale for concluding state
has power to alter definition of obscenity when applied to minors); see also Book-
case Inc. v. Broderick, 218 N.E.2d 668, 671 (N.Y. 1966) ("[M]aterial which is pro-
tected for distribution to adults is not necessarily constitutionally protected from
restriction upon its dissemination to children.... the concept of obscenity or of
unprotected matter may vary according to the group to whom the questionable
material is directed or from whom it is quarantined.").
29. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
30. See id. at 631 (describing appellant's stationery store/lunch counter that
sold magazines, including "some so-called 'girlie' magazines").
1999]
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material was not deemed obscene for adults.3 1 Relying on its parens patriae
authority previously articulated in Prince v. Massachusetts,32 the court held
that "the power of the state to control the conduct of children reache[d]
beyond the scope of its authority over adults."3 3 Thus, the Court upheld
the New York statute in favor of protecting children from harmful mate-
rial. 34 Making a limited inquiry into whether children needed such pro-
tection, the Court found that "while these studies all agree [d] that a causal
link [between obscene material and antisocial conduct had] not been
demonstrated, they [were] equally agreed that a causal link has not been
disproved either."35 Based on this limited, and now dated, inquiry, Gins-
berg continues to be cited as support for the proposition that children
must be protected from information available to adults in the media.3 6
31. See id. at 632 (explaining statutory basis for conviction). The statute at
issue limited the sale of magazines "which depicted female 'nudity' in a manner
defined in subsection 1 (b), that is 'the showing of. . . female ... buttocks with less
than a full opaque covering, or the showing of the female breast with less than a
fully opaque covering of any portion thereof below the top of the nipple. . . " and:
(2) that the pictures were 'harmful to minors' in that they had, within the
meaning of subsection 1 (f) 'that quality of ... representation . . . of
nudity... [which] ... (i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shame-
ful or morbid interest of minors, and (ii) is patently offensive to prevail-
ing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is
suitable material for minors, and (iii) is utterly without redeeming social
importance for minors.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.10 (McKinney 1989). The Court specifically found that the
magazines at issue were not obscene for adults. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 634 (hold-
ing that the "girlie" magazines were not obscene for adults based on Redrup v. New
York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967)).
32. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
33. Id. at 170; see Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640 (citing concurring opinion of People
v. Kahan, 206 N.E.2d 333 (N.Y. 1965), which noted protection of children cannot
always be left to parents and guardians, therefore reasonable regulation on sale of
pornography to children is proper).
34. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 633 (affirming conviction of vendor who sold
"adult" magazine to 15-year-old boy in contravention of state law).
35. Id. at 642-43. The Court cited Dr. Gaylin of the Columbia University Psy-
choanalytic Clinic who described the potentially harmful impact that pornography
may have on the developing ego. See id. at n.10 ("It is in the period of growth [of
youth] when these patterns of behavior are laid down ... when sensuality is being
defined and fears elaborated, when pressure confronts security and impulse en-
counters control-it is in this period.., that legalized pornography may conceiva-
bly be damaging."). Dr. Gaylin noted that "a child might not be as well prepared
as an adult to make an intelligent choice as to the material he chooses to read." Id.
The Court further cited Dr. Gaylin as stating that children are currently protected
when viewing pornography by the knowledge that it is disapproved of. See id. Dr.
Gaylin noted that open permission implies parental approval and even suggests
encouragement. See id. (stating to openly permit implies parental and societal ap-
proval and "seductive encouragement"). The Court, however, did not note the
type of harm that might ensue from such tacit approval. The Court went further
to assert that people "do not demand of legislatures 'scientifically certain criteria
of legislation."' Id. at 643 (citation omitted).
36. See id. at 638-43 (explaining need for state to protect children from ob-
scene material). Current research indicates that this view may be flawed. SeeJoHN-
752 [Vol. 44: p. 745
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Although a state may define obscenity more stringently with respect
to minors than it does for adults, a state may not prohibit certain forms of
speech merely because children may be exposed to them.3 7 For example,
in 1975, the Court held that a city ordinance prohibiting the display of
films depicting nudity at drive-in theaters was unconstitutional.3 8 Further-
more, the Court could not justify the ordinance under its police power as
an attempt to protect children from viewing potentially objectionable ma-
terial.3 9 The Court held that "all nudity cannot be deemed obscene even
as to minors." 40 Just because the legislature perceived nudity-a form of
speech-as unsuitable for youth, it was not willing to suppress such speech
on these grounds.41 "In most circumstances, the values protected by the
First Amendment are no less applicable when government seeks to control
the flow of information to minors. 42
Despite the Court's well-articulated position-to protect the free ex-
pression rights of children-the Court has continued to uphold statutes
SON COMMISSION, supra note 16 ("In sum, empirical research ... has found no
evidence to date that exposure to explicit sexual materials plays a significant role
in the causation of delinquents or criminal behavior among youth or adults.").
The etiology of antisocial personality disorder is "multifaceted and transactional,"
including psychobiological, familial, sociocognitive and peer-related. See STEPHEN
P. HINSHAW & CAROLYN A. ANDERSON, CONDUCT AND OPPOSITIONAL DEFIANT DISOR-
DERS 135 (EricJ. Mash & Russell A. Barkely eds., 1996) (describing current state of
knowledge about development and treatment of behavior disorders in children).
Human behavior is multidetermined; simply viewing pornography itself is not
likely to directly cause antisocial behavior. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1973) (admitting, based on Johnson Commission's report on
pornography, that "there is no conclusive proof of a connection between antisocial
behavior and obscene material"); see also AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAC-
NOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 522-25 (1994) (describing
paraphilias and noting that clinical disorder must be distinguished on basis of clin-
ically significant distress or impairment, not mere non-pathological use of objects
as stimulus for sexual excitement).
37. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 864 (1997) (noting government's theory
of CDA's constitutionality based on Ginsberg); Sable Communications v. FCC, 492
U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (recognizing interest in protecting physical and psychological
well-being of minors that extends to shielding them from material that is not ob-
scene by adult standards); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1973) (noting
states have legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination of obscene materials
where there is danger of exposure to juveniles).
38. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 205 (1975) (holding
that Florida statute prohibiting films containing nudity from being shown at drive-
ins in order to restrict minors from viewing this form of expression was overbroad
and consequently unconstitutional); Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 637 (affirming that state
governments may restrict minors right to sexually explicit material more so than
adults).
39. See Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 205 (noting ordinance cannot "be justified as an
exercise of the city's police power for the protection of children").
40. Id. at 213.
41. See id. at 213-14 ("Speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject
to some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the
young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.").
42. Id. at 214.
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restricting speech based on the idea that children may be exposed to of-
fensive speech. 41 In addition to restricting speech determined obscene as
to minors, speech that is deemed indecent has also been off limits to mi-
nors. 44 In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,45 George Carlin's satirical mono-
logue, "Filthy Words," came under attack as being indecent speech and
was restricted on the theory that radio broadcasts are uniquely accessible
to children.46 The Court reiterated the standard set forth in Ginsberg, that
the "government's interest in the 'well-being of its youth' and in support-
ing 'parents' claim to authority in their own household' justified regula-
tion of otherwise protected expression." 4 7 Because this form of speech
was comprehensible to even a first grader, the Court found limiting the
availability of such speech to be constitutional. 48
The Supreme Court faced the issue of whether to protect children
from offensive speech over the telephone in Sable Communications v. FCC.49
The issue arose under section 223(b) of the Communications Act of 1934,
as amended, which sought to restrict minor's access to "Dial-A-Porn."
50
The Court, however, struck down this legislation, noting that less restric-
tive means short of a total ban were available that could equally protect
children from "Dial-A-Porn." 5 1 The Court distinguished Pacifica because
children do not have the same access to commercial telephone communi-
cations as they do to radio broadcasting and because indecent telephone
43. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1977) (discussing
limitations of indecent speech in radio broadcasts due to unique accessibility of
broadcasting to children, even those too young to read).
44. See id. at 750-51 (holding "when the Commission finds that a pig has en-
tered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof
that the pig is obscene"); Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 120 (1989)
(noting provision sought to restrict minors from receiving access to "sexually oi-
ented commercial telephone messages").
45. 438 U.S. 726 (1997).
46. See id. at 729 (referring to satiric humorist George Carlin's 12 minute
monologue entitled 'Filthy Words' .... the words you couldn't say on the public
... airwaves"). The monologue is reprinted in the appendix of the opinion. See id.
at 751-55.
47. Id. at 749.
48. See id. (noting "Pacifica's broadcast could have enlarged a child's vocabu-
lary in an instant").
49. See Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (noting communi-
cations service that offered sexually oriented prerecorded telephone messages to
callers brought suit claiming that 47 U.S.C. § 223(b)'s regulation of obscenity and
indecency were unconstitutional).
50. See id. at 120 (noting relevant provision criminalized transmission of ob-
scene or indecent commercial interstate telephone communications to persons
under 18 years of age); see also Dial Info. Serv. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535,
1541-43 (2d Cir. 1991) (upholding federal statute prohibiting indecent telephone
message services based upon rationale that statute, as drafted, was least restrictive
means of achieving limitation on children's accessibility to indecency).
51. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 131 (holding that § 223(b) "is not a narrowly tailored
effort to serve the compelling interest of preventing minors from being exposed to
indecent telephone messages").
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communications do not present the problem of surprise present with un-
willing listeners.5 2 It should be noted though that both of the previous
cases, Pacifica and Sable, involved indecent speech and not obscenity.5 3
C. Obscenity versus Indecency
Indecent speech differs from obscene speech, in both definition and
constitutional protection, and, as seen in Pacifica, also with respect to con-
text and to conduct.5 4 The Code of Federal Regulations defines inde-
cency as focusing on sexual and excretory activities or organs.5 5 Indecent
speech is not merely material that "borders on obscenity."56 Indecent
speech may, however, include all "patently offensive" material that has lit-
erary, artistic, scientific or political merit, thus avoiding the reach of
Miller.57 The problem with legislation to restrict offensive speech is that
frequently, categories of speech that are both obscene and indecent are
restricted by one regulation. 58 Examples of the most extreme forms of
obscene speech are given to justify regulation of both obscene and inde-
52. See id. at 127-28 (discussing how purchasers of dial-a-porn need to take
affirmative steps to receive service offered and are not taken by surprise by inde-
cent message).
53. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 732 (1977) (characterizing mon-
ologue as indecent due to "exposure of children to language that describes, in
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for
the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the day
when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience") (citation
omitted); Sable, 492 U.S. at 131 (holding that restriction of adult access to indecent
telephone messages "far exceeds that which is necessary to limit access of minors
to such messages" and thus does not survive constitutional scrutiny).
54. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 732 n.6 (noting opinion of Commissioners Robin-
son and Hooks: " [w] e can regulate offensive speech to the extent it constitutes a
public nuisance .... The governing idea is that 'indecency' is not an inherent
attribute of words themselves; it is rather a matter of context and conduct .... ").
55. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.701 (1998) (noting "[a]n indecent program is one that
describes or depicts sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive
manner as measured by contemporary community standards for the cable
medium").
56. Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(Wald, Tatel & Rogers, J., dissenting) (noting that indecent material "includes lit-
erarily, artistically, scientifically, and politically meritorious material"). The dis-
senters concluded that neither the indecency market nor material breaks down
neatly. See id. at 136 (noting that given free choice in matter, "the mildly curious
might well decide to watch an 'unvarnished' documentary on the Mapplethorpe
exhibit if it is readily available").
57. See id. at 130 (noting that if such material lacked merit, it would fall within
purview of Miller and be labeled obscene). But see Action for Children's Television
v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that work's serious merit does
not necessarily imply that material is not indecent).
58. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 848 (1997) (noting that term ob-
scene may remain; however, term indecent must be severed from § 223(a) in order
to preserve statute's constitutionality); Sable, 492 U.S. at 129 ("There is no doubt
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cent speech.59 But in the debate over publications on the Internet, dis-
tinctions must be drawn between obscene speech and indecent speech.
D. Reno and the Communications Decency Act
The debate over legislation of morality once again took center stage
when the CDA was challenged for its regulation of potentially offensive
speech in cyberspace in Reno v. ACLU. 60 The ACLU filed a complaint in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
alleging that the CDA was unconstitutional on its face because it: (1)
criminalized expression protected by the First Amendment; (2) was over-
broad and vague; and (3) was not the least restrictive way to achieve a
compelling government purpose.6 1 Particularly, Title 47 of the United
States Code, § 223(b), prohibited any verbal or visual communication that
was "obscene or indecent" from being knowingly transmitted to any per-
son who was eighteen years or younger. 62 The second challenged provi-
sion, § 223(d), prohibited "sending or displaying patently offensive
messages in a manner that [was] available to a person under 18 years." 63
The CDA did permit affirmative defenses for those persons who either
took "good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions" to restrict
minor's access or who restricted minors access through the use of credit
cards or adult identification number. 64 The complainants, however, did
not view these protections as adequate and listed examples of protected
speech that would be in violation of the CDA.
65
Such examples of protected speech proscribed by the CDA included
safer sex instructions posted by Critical Path, reproductive planning infor-
mation posted by Planned Parenthood Federation of America, human
rights atrocities described by Human Rights Watch and accounts of prison
rape posted by Stop Prisoner Rape.6 6 Each of these organizations asserted
that access to this information would benefit children, but under current
59. See Cyberporn, supra note 3, at 1 (noting various extreme forms of obscene
speech and danger of reacting without drawing reasoned distinctions).
60. See Reno, 521 U.S. 844, 844 (1997) ("Plaintiffs filed suit challenging consti-
tutionality of provisions of Communications Decency Act (CDA) provisions seek-
ing to protect minors from harmful material on the Internet.").
61. See Complaint, supra note 4, at *1 (setting forth causes of action).
62. Id. at *5-6 (pleading statutory bases for complaint).
63. 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (1994) (describing age restrictions); Reno, 521 U.S. at
859 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 223(d), which prohibits sending or displaying "any com-
ment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that, in con-
text, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured-by contemporary
community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of
whether the user of such service placed the call or initiated the activity").
64. 47 U.S.C. § 223(e) (5) (a) & (b).
65. See Complaint, supra note 4, at *10-23 (pleading examples of arguably pro-
tected speech prohibited by CDA).
66. See id. at *11-19.
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law, such access would be restricted. 67 The stated purpose of the CDA was
to protect children from cyberporn. 68 But, by banning both obscene and
indecent speech on the Internet, the CDA also suppressed protected
speech.69 To solve the immediate problem, the Court severed the clause
"indecent" from the legislation. 70 The Court did not, however, address
whether children indeed required protection from this type of speech. 71
As the following section will demonstrate, children are harmed by two
highly specific types of pornography: (1) sexually violent pornography and
(2) child pornography, and therefore legislation should be focused on re-
stricting only these forms of harmful obscene expression. 72 Until this fact
is clearly addressed, scientifically untenable, protectionist rhetoric will
continue to appear. 73
III. DISCUSSION: THE PROBLEM OF PORNOGRAPHY
Pornography is an emotionally charged term, and a discrepancy exists
over its precise meaning.7 4 Scientific evidence related to pornography has
67. See id. (arguing that children would benefit from information on Internet
that CDA would prohibit).
68. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 867 (1997) (noting that "the purpose of
the CDA is to protect children from the primary effects of 'indecent' and 'patently
offensive' speech").
69. See id. at 878 (noting that under CDA, "a parent who sent his 17 year old
college freshman information on birth control via e-mail could be incarcerated
even though neither he, his child, nor anyone in their home community, [sic]
found the material 'indecent' or 'patently offensive"'); see also ACLU v. Johnson, 4
F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1034 (D.N.M. 1998) (invalidating state statute similar to CDA
that prohibited indecency, intercourse and nudity from being made available to
children).
70. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 833 (stating that Court will "sever the term 'or inde-
cent' from the statute, leaving the rest of § 223(a) standing").
71. See id. at 875 (noting that Congress did not consider effectiveness of FCC
regulations in prohibiting minors from accessing Dial-A-Porn or computer
pornography).
72. For a discussion on the scientific evaluation of pornography, see infra
notes 74-106 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 1029-30 (discussing New Mexico's stat-
ute, similar to CDA, which banned minors from accessing Internet communica-
tions containing indecent materials).
74. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19 n.2 (1972) (describing defini-
tions of pornography, originating from Greek "porne," meaning harlot, and
"graphos," meaning writing, evolving into meaning writing not only about prosti-
tutes, but also about licentiousness or lewdness, or "portrayal of erotic behavior
designed to cause sexual excitement" (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY (1969)); see also GORDON HAWKINGS & FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, PORNOGRA-
PHY IN A FREE SOCIETY 21-24 (1988) (describing different definitions of pornogra-
phy through three governmental commissions on pornography). The Johnson
Committee used the terms "explicit sexual materials," "sexually oriented material,"
and "erotica" to refer to the subject matter under investigation. SeeJOHNSON COM-
MISSION, supra note 6, at 3, 4 (defining pornography for 1970 study). The Williams
Commission defined the term pornography explicitly: "The term 'pornography'
always refers to a book, verse, painting, photograph, film or some such thing -
what in general may be called a representation .... We take it that ... a porno-
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been examined and used to advance political objectives.7 5 In advancing
political opinions, however, the data may have been mischaracterized.
76
More frequently, empirical statements are made without support.77 Be-
cause of the divergence in opinions in defining pornography, this Com-
ment will use pornography to describe sexually explicit materials designed
and intended to produce sexual arousal in the viewer. 78 To properly ex-
amine the arguments presented for and against the CDA, the nature of
pornography deserves careful discussion. Several objections to pornogra-
phy have been lodged. These include claims that pornography: (a) causes
increased violence, particularly against women; (b) offers negative views of
women; (c) creates early eroticization of children; and (d) encourages ac-
tions by predatory-sexual offenders. 79 Alternatively, the potential benefits
of sexually explicit materials will be explored.
graphic representation is one that combines two features: it has a certain function
or intention, to arouse its audience sexually, and also a certain content, explicit
representations of sexual material." WILLIAMS COMMITrEE OF GREAT BRITAIN 80
(Home Office, 1979) [hereinafter WILLIAMS COMMITTEE]. The Meese Commission
notes that "[t]o call something 'pornographic' is plainly.., to condemn it." U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY 228
(1986) [hereinafter MEESE COMMISSION] (defining pornography for 1986 study).
75. See generally MEESE, supra note 74, at 228 (examining available evidence of
effects of pornography and concluding despite lack of empirical evidence that por-
nography is harmful); see also JOHNSON, supra note 76, at 3 (examining available
evidence of effects of pornography); Brian L. Wilcox, Pornography, Social Science and
Politics: When Research and Ideology Collide, 42 AM. PSYCHOL. 941, 941 (1987) (noting
criticism of commissioners of Meese Commission for not having background in
scientific study of pornography and for being chosen for their ideological views).
76. See Daniel Linz, et al., The Findings and Recommendations of the Attorney Gen-
eral's Commission on Pornography: Do the Psychological "Facts" Fit the Political Fuy?, 42
AM. PSYCHOL. 946, 946 (1987) (noting "the authors find several of the commis-
sion's findings and recommendations incongruent with available research data");
see also Wilcox, supra note 75, at 941 (noting that conclusions delegates on Meese
Commission drew were "based on overgeneralizations from social psychological
studies that were largely laboratory based" and that findings were consequently
misrepresented).
77. See Stewart Page, The Turnaround on Pornography Research: Some Implications
for Psychology and Women, 31 CANADIAN PSYCHOL. 359, 359 (1990) (finding that
Meese Commission's conclusions were "fatally flawed" by overgeneralizing results
based on laboratory studies).
78. See MEESE COMMISSION, supra note 74, at 228-29 (defining pornography as
.material [that] is predominantly sexually explicit and intended primarily for the
purpose of sexual arousal").
79. See Cyberporn, supra note 4, at 115 (statement of Dee Jepsen, Executive
Director, Enough is Enough campaign) (noting that pornography is harmful in
several ways). Ms. Jepsen states:
[Pornography] plays a major role in the molestation of children, serving
as an instruction manual for these crimes; it exposes children at an im-
pressionable age to attitudes and behaviors that warp and twist their view
of human dignity and sexuality; it shapes negative, degrading attitudes
about women, eroticizing inequality; it encourages rape and the rape
myth, that women say "no" but mean "yes" and they like violence; it er-
oticizes violence and then fuels sexual violence; it holds an addictive and
fatal attraction for many men and teenage boys, it invades their thoughts
[Vol. 44: p. 745
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A. Violence Against Women
Three governmental commissions have examined the behavioral ef-
fects pornography has on sexual violence; however, each commission has
reached a different conclusion.80 These differing opinions, however, do
not represent significant differences in the evidence at three different
points in time, but rather different methods of analyzing the available re-
search. 8 1 The first two opinions found that pornography could not be
causally linked to antisocial behavior.8 2 The opinion most damning of
pornography, that of the Meese Commission, concluded that there was a
causal relationship between exposure to many forms of pornography and
antisocial effects, particularly violence against women.8 3 Several of the
conclusions of the Meese Commission's report, however, are inconsistent
with available empirical data.8 4
The Meese Commission came to the conclusion that viewing all sexu-
ally explicit materials, or all pornographic materials, "as one undifferenti-
ated whole is unjustified by common sense, unwarranted on the evidence,
and an altogether oversimplifying way of looking at a complex phenome-
and manipulates their behavior; it encourages the transmission of STD's
... and it lowers community standards, which has a denigrating affect
upon our entire culture.
Id. The statement of Ms. Jepsen offers neither support nor citation for any of the
above assertions.
80. CompareJOHNSON COMMISSION, supra note 76, at 27 ("[E]mpirical research
designed to clarify the question has found no evidence .. , that exposure to ex-
plicit sexual material plays a significant role in the causation of delinquent or crim-
inal behaviors. The Commission cannot conclude that exposure to erotic
materials is a factor in the causation of sex crimes or sex delinquency."), with WiL-
LIAMS COMMIT=EE, supra note 74, at 80 ("It is not possible, in our view, to reach
well-based conclusions about what in this county has been the influence of pomog-
raphy on sexual crime."), and MEESE COMMISSION, supra note 74, at 326 ("[W]e
have reached the conclusion, unanimously and confidently, that the available evi-
dence strongly supports the hypothesis that substantial exposure to sexually violent
materials as described here bear a causal relationship to antisocial acts of sexual
violence, and for some subgroups possible to unlawful acts of sexual violence.").
81. See HAWKINS & ZIMRING, supra note 74, at 77-76 ("No new statistical studies
of either the incidence of sex crimes in the general population areas or the behav-
ior of sex offenders led to the Meese Commission's rejection of theJohnson Com-
mission's conclusions .... The anecdotal evidence cited by the Meese Commission
in 1986 was in abundant supply when the two earlier bodies took evidence.").
82. SeeJOHNSON COMMITTEE, supra note 74, at 27 ("In sum, empirical research
designed to clarify the question has found no evidence to date that exposure to
explicit sexual materials plays a significant role in the causation of delinquent or
criminal behavior among youth or adults."); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Sla-
ton, 413 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1973) (noting there is "no conclusive proof of a connec-
tion between antisocial behavior and obscene material").
83. See MEESE COMMISSION, supra note 74, at 325-26 (concluding that because
there is causal relationship between exposure to sexually violent materials and in-
crease in aggressive behavior towards women, there is also causal relationship be-
tween sexually violent materials and antisocial acts of sexual violence).
84. See Linz, supra note 76, at 946 (finding "several of the commission's find-
ings and recommendations [are] incongruent with available research data").
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non."8 5 Thus, the Commission evaluated the harm of pornography by di-
viding pornography into four categories: (1) sexually violent material, (2)
nonviolent materials depicting degradation, domination, subordination or
humiliation, (3) nonviolent and nondegrading materials, and (4)
nudity.8
6
The conclusion that pornography is related to antisocial acts is based
on literature noting the relationship between sexually violent pornogra-
phy and unfavorable behavior, not the relationship of the broad spectrum
of pornographic material and antisocial behavior.8 7 The relationship be-
tween sexually violent pornography and the increase in sexual violence is
more likely due to exposure to violent materials than to the sexual explic-
itness of the material in question.88 The conclusion of -the Meese
Commission is flawed because it adopts a causal attribution between por-
nography and violence and it confounds the constructs of violence and
explicitness.8
9
Exposure to sexually violent material has been shown to increase
male but not female acceptance of interpersonal violence and to increase
the acceptance of rape myths. 90 In a group of studies designed specifically
to disentangle the effects of sexual explicitness and violence, researchers
85. MEESE COMMISSION, supra note 74, at 320-21 (presenting rationale for sub-
dividing pornography into four categories). The Commission goes on to note that
the subdivision of pornography for purposes of analysis was one of the most impor-
tant conclusions the commission reached. See id. (finding viewing sexually explicit
material "as one undifferentiated whole is unjustified by common sense, unwar-
ranted on the evidence, and an altogether oversimplifying way of looking at a com-
plex phenomenon. In many respects we consider this one of our most important
conclusions.").
86. See id. at 321 (denoting four subtypes of pornography and analyzing harm
associated with each); see also Linz, supra note 76, at 947-52 (reviewing four catego-
ries of pornography in Meese report).
87. See MEESE COMMISSION, supra note 74, at 324 ("In both clinical and experi-
mental settings, exposure to sexually violent materials has indicated an increase in
the likelihood of aggression .... [This research] shows a causal relationship be-
tween exposure to material of this type and aggressive behavior towards women.").
88. Compare Linz, supra note 76, at 952 (noting that "[i]t has now been fairly
well documented that violent material, whether sexually explicit or not, has the
potential to promote violent behavior following exposure."), with MEESE COMMIS-
SION, supra note 74, at 328 (concluding that adverse consequences such as support
of 'rape myth' "do not vary with the extent of sexual explicitness so long as the
violence is presented in an undeniably sexual context"). The Commission does note,
however, that "it is unclear whether sexually violent material makes a substantially
greater casual contribution to sexual violence itself than does material containing
violence alone." Id. at 328.
89. See Linz, supra note 76, at 949-50 (noting that "much of the evidence for
stating that sexually violent pornography is harmful is based on studies that have
used materials that either confounded sexual explicitness and violence or materi-
als that were not sexually explicit") (citations omitted).
90. See EDwARD DONNERSTEIN ET AL., THE QUESTION OF PORNOGRAPHY: RE-
SEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 109-10 (1987) (noting that important to
this analysis is fact that materials were not X-rated films, but programs suitable for
prime time television).
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concluded that sexually violent media materials correlated with the high-
est rate of violent responses.9 1 Materials that were violent but devoid of
sexual explicitness correlated with the second highest rate of violent re-
sponses. 92 Finally, materials that were sexually explicit, but non-violent,
were least correlated with violent responses of the three groups. 93 Addi-
tionally, research with individuals prone to callous attitudes toward vio-
lence against women has demonstrated that exposure to non-sexually
explicit images of rape were sexually arousing.
94
Violence in the media has been linked to aggressive behavior both in
adults and in children.95 Both children and adults seem to imitate behav-
91. See Edward Donnerstein et al., Role of Aggressive and Sexual Images in Violent
Pornography (unpublished manuscript) (1986) cited in DONNERSTEIN, supra note 90,
at 100 [hereinafter Donnerstein, Manuscript] (noting that men who viewed violent
pornography displayed highest level of aggression against female confederates
whereas men who viewed aggression-only film were more aggressive than men who
viewed sex-only film condition).
92. See generally Daniel G. Linz et al., Effects of Long-Term Exposure to Violent and
Sexually Degrading Depictions of Women, 55 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 758, 758-
59 (1988) (examining effects of emotional desensitization to films of violence
against women, sexually degrading explicit films and non-explicit films on beliefs
against women).
Researchers concluded that subjects who viewed violent film did not demon-
strate a decline in empathic responses to re-enactment of sexual assault trial, con-
trary to hypotheses based on previous research. See id. at 765-66 ("The results
failed to support the hypotheses derived from Zillman and Bryant's previous stud-
ies.., that long-term exposure to degrading images of women either in the form
of X-rated, nonviolent sexually explicit films or R-rated sexually nonexplicit films
will affect the subsequent beliefs and attitudes about women."). Longer exposure
to violent material was necessary to affect empathy in previous research. See id. at
759 (citing Zillman and Bryant studies that noted that long-term exposure to sexu-
ally degrading pornography affected subject empathy, however, these results were
not confirmed in present study).
93. See id. at 765-66 (finding no difference between sexually explicit and non-
violent films). The study found:
No statistically significant main effects or interactions for the film type,
film dosage, of acquaintance or non-acquaintance trial independent vari-
ables on either the pretrial questionnaire scales assessing rape myth ac-
ceptance, belief in women as sexual objects, endorsement of force in
sexual relations, conservative sex roles, and rape myth acceptance or the
posttrial assessments of the victim, defendant, verdict, or sentence.
Id.
94. See DoNNERsrIN ET AL., supra note 91, at 111 (citing Abel et al., The Com-
ponents of Rapists' Sexual Arousa4 34 ARCHIvEs GEN. PSYCHIATRY 395 (1977) (noting
rapists were aroused by non-sexually explicit images of women being raped)); Neil
Malamuth et al., Sexual Arousal in Response to Aggression: Ideological, Aggressive, and
Sexual Correlates, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 330, 340 (1986) (demonstrat-
ing that "depiction of a woman as a victim of aggression devoid of sexual content can
stimulate sexual arousal").
95. See generally Linda Heath, Effects of Media Violence on Children: A Review of
the Literature, 46 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHATRY 376, 376-77 (1989) (explaining mimicry
of aggression). The study found:
Anyone who looks at the accumulated research into the consequences of
observed violence must be impressed by the consistency of the findings.
The overwhelming majority of published reports in this area indicate that
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ior of models, including modeled acts of aggression. 96 Exposure to media
violence has also been demonstrated to increase the accessibility of violent
constructs in memory, known as priming.9 7 The priming influence in-
creases the degree to which persons think violent thoughts and view vio-
lent behavior as acceptable. 98 Viewing violent behavior in the media has
at least some people seeing aggression on the television or movie screen,
or even on the printed page, are more likely to act aggressively sooner
afterward than they otherwise would have.
Id. at 376; see Wendy Wood et al., Effects of Media Violence on Viewers' Aggression in
Unconstrained Social Interaction, 109 PSYCHOL. BULL. 371, 378 (1991) (finding
through meta-analysis that exposure to media violence increases viewer's aggres-
sion in adolescents and children).
96. See Albert Bandura et al., Vicarious Reinforcement and Imitative Learning, 67J.
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 601, 601 (1963) (finding that consequences to model
affected imitative learning of aggression in preschool children); see a/SOJEROME L.
SINGER & DOROTHY G. SINGER, TELEVISION, IMAGINATION, AND AGGRESSION: A STUDY
OF PRESCHOOLERS 99-101 (1981) (describing how aggressive behavior in children
may be facilitated by exposure to modeled aggression on television especially for
those children already predisposed to acts of aggression). The Singer's study at
Yale University concluded that "there is indeed a strong and stable relationship
between television-viewing and patterns of aggressive behavior in preschool chil-
dren." Id. at 109.
97. See Brad J. Bushman, Priming Effects of Media Violence on the Accessibility of
Aggressive Constructs in Memory, 24 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 537, 538
(1998) [hereinafter Bushman, Priming] (explaining priming). The "pre-exposure
strength of a mental construct relevant to the environmental input has been re-
ferred to as its accessibility. The more accessible a construct, the more likely it is to
be used to process and interpret social information." Id. (citations ommitted).
The temporary increase in accessibility of construct due to repeated or recent ex-
posure is known as priming. See id.; see also CLIFFORD ET AL., supra note 7, at 208
(explaining two theories of priming). The first theory posits a cognitive pathway
model where activation of one semantic memory links it to memories representing
relations between constructs. See id. (noting memory is interlinked network con-
sisting of nodes representing constructs and links between those nodes). Re-
peated activation strengthens associations and ease with which memory is recalled
to given stimulus. See id. (noting more frequently particular attribute is activated,
more likely it is to be accessed from semantic memory in future). The second
theory posits a storage bin model. See id. In this construct, most recent memory is
on top of a storage bin, so it is first accessed in processing new information. See id.
98. See Brad J. Bushman & Russell G. Geen, Role of Cognitive-Emotional
Mediators and Individual Differences in the Effects of Media Violence on Aggression, 58 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 156, 158-59 (1990) (finding that undergraduate sub-
jects were more likely to record thoughts with violent content after viewing a video
segment with violence and that tendency toward violent thoughts is somewhat me-
diated by personality variables of hostility and irritability); Brad J. Bushman, Mod-
erating Role of Trait Aggressiveness in the Effects of Violent Media on Aggression, 69 J. OF
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 950, 950 (1995) (finding that videotape violence was
more likely to increase aggression in highly trait aggressive individuals); Bushman,
supra note 97, at 538 (finding that undergraduate subjects were more likely to
record violent associations to word association task after viewing segment of violent
video than after viewing non-violent video segment); see also Travis Langley et al.,
Aggression-Consistent, -Inconsistent, and -Irrelevant Priming Effects on Selective Exposure to
Media Violence, 18 AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 349, 354 (1992) (discussing how priming can
also work in reverse, subjects who were aggressively primed were more likely to
select violent video material to view).
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also been shown to increase children's toleration of violence in others.99
Therefore, violent media materials appear to be associated with more ad-
verse effects on behavior than sexually explicit media materials.
It is possible that sexual explicitness paired with aggression can en-
hance aggressive responses. 100 The Meese Commission, however, went
one step further and linked the increase in aggression with the increase in
sexual violence toward women. 10 1 Where the scientific evidence left off,
the Meese Commission relied on "common sense" to draw inferences that
sexually violent pornography would lead to increases not only in aggres-
sion, but also in sexual violence.10 2 More commonly, violence against wo-
men is present in contexts that are not sexually explicit and therefore not
obscene.' 0 3 "Slasher" films present much more violence against women
than do sexually explicit films. 10 4 Such films are not usually viewed by
small children; though, television itself provides children with access to a
99. See Fred Molitor & Kenneth William Hirsch, Children's Toleration of Real-
Life Aggression after Exposure to Media Violence: A Replication of the Drabman & Thomas
Studies, 24 CHILD STUDYJ. 1991, 1991-202 (1994) (noting that children who viewed
violent movie "The Karate Kid" were more tolerant of real-life aggression, such as
hitting or chasing, than were children who had not viewed stimulus movie). It
should be noted, however, that the significance level in this study was .08 and
power was only .44 because of small sample size. See id. at 201 (noting statistical
power based on sample size of 42 children); see also Dolf Zillmann & James B.
Weaver III, Psychoticism in the Effect of Prolonged Exposure to Gratuitous Media Violence
on the Acceptance of Violence as a Preferred Means of Conflict Resolution, 22 PERSONALITY
& INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 613, 627 (1997) ("Consumption of gratuitous violence
consistently fostered greater acceptance of violence as a means of conflict resolu-
tion."). Respondents in the aforementioned study were undergraduate college
students who viewed a movie, then completed a seemingly unconnected survey on
conflict resolution completed several days later. See id. at 616. The main effect for
the type of movie achieved trend significance with a p value of .10. See id. at 618.
100. See Donnerstein Manuscript, supra note 91, at 100 (explaining study
results). Subjects who viewed violent pornographic video responded with the
highest degree of aggression. See id. at 102. Subjects who viewed aggressive only
material, however, responded more aggressively than subjects who viewed material
that was sexually explicit but not aggressive. See id. at 100. Therefore, the results of
the study indicate that aggression in the media is more likely to be associated with
aggressive responses than sexual explicitness is likely to be associated with aggres-
sion. See id.
101. See MEESE COMMISSION supra note 74, at 325 ("Finding a link between
aggressive behavior towards women and sexual violence, whether lawful or unlaw-
ful, requires assumptions not found exclusively in the experimental evidence. We
see no reason, however, not to make these assumptions.").
102. See id. at 325 ("They are also to all of us assumptions that are plainly
justified by our own common sense."); see also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
642 (1967) (describing literature on obscenity and harmful effects on children and
concluding that although literature available in 1969, nearly 30 years ago, could
not conclusively establish causal harm from pornography, literature could not con-
clusively disprove causal link, inferring that such proof was not necessary to justify
legal outcome).
103. See Linz, supra note 76, at 950 (discussing how more aggression is present
in R-rated films than in X-rated films).
104. See id. (providing examples of high degree of aggression in R-rated films
as compared to X-rated films).
1999]
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large number of violent acts. 10 5 Additionally, the non-violent forms of
pornography as defined by the Meese Commission cannot be causally re-
lated to increases in antisocial acts.10 6 Consequently, it appears that vio-
lence, but not sexual explicitness per se, is harmful, and deserving of
government proscription.
B. Offering Negative Views of Women
Scholars portray the negative depiction of women as sexual objects as
one of pornography's primary harms. 10 7 Depicting women as sexual ob-
jects, existing for the pleasure of men, enjoying pain, bondage or torture,
or as subservient to the interests of the alpha male, have been argued to
have a deleterious effect on the perception of women and implicitly re-
lated to violence against women.108 The scholarly discussion of pornogra-
phy as a perceived harm and the scientific proof of pornography's
negative depiction of women as a measurable adversity, however, are dis-
tinctly different topics.
Feminist scholarship on pornography emphasizes the use of pornog-
raphy in a power dynamic whereby men, in the dominant position, main-
tain women in a subservient position for men's benefit. 10 9 Pornography
depicts women as sexual objects, to be acted upon, viewing the act as one
105. See Bushman, Trait Aggressiveness, supra note 97, at 950 (describing fre-
quency of violence in mass media) (quoting AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASsoCIA-
TION, BIG WORLD, SMALL SCREEN: THE ROLE OF TELEVISION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY
(1992) as saying, "By the time the average child graduates from elementary school,
he or she will have witnessed more than 8,000 murders and more than 100,000
other assorted acts of violence on televison.").
106. See DONNERSTEIN, supra note 90, at 951 (noting "it has not been consist-
ently demonstrated that callous attitudes about rape result from exposure to de-
grading but nonviolent sexual material"); see also MEESE COMMISSION supra note 74,
at 332 ("[T]here is less evidence causally linking the material with sexual aggres-
sion.... The absence of evidence should by no means be taken to deny the exist-
ence of the causal link.") "The totality of the social science evidence [on non-
degrading, non-violent pornography], therefore, is slightly against the hypothesis
that non-violent and non-degrading materials bear a causal relationship to acts of
sexual violence." Id. at 337-38.
107. See Diana E. H. Russell, Introduction, in MAKING VIOLENCE SExY FEMINIST
VIEWS ON PORNOGRAPHY 6 (Diana E. H. Russell ed., 1993) (defining sexual objecti-
fication as referring to women as "depersonalized sexual things such as 'tits, cunt,
and ass,' not as multi-faceted human beings deserving equal rights with men"). See
generally ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPH. MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 201 (1981)
(stating, for example, that "[t]he fact that pornography is widely believed to be
'sexual representations' or 'depictions of sex' emphasizes only that the valuation of
women as low whores is widespread and that the sexuality of women is perceived as
low and whorish in and of itself").
108. See Mimi H. Silbert & Ayala M. Pines, Pornography and Sexual Abuse of
Women, in MAKING VIOLENCE SEXY, supra note 107, at 115 (concluding based on
study of street prostitutes that "imitation model" of pornography is supported).
109. See DWORKIN, supra note 107, at 113 (describing male supremacy and use
of pornography in power dynamic).
[Vol. 44: p. 745
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of male supremacy." 0 Women are maintained in a subservient position
by force.11 1 But much of the scholarship in this area is distorted by the
previously articulated explicitness-violence confound.' 12 Examples of wo-
men bound, hurt or physically dominated, set in a sexualized setting, may
indeed promote harm to women, as the previous discussion of sexually
violent pornography indicates; the bulk of empirical evidence, however,
does not support the assertion that sexually explicit material, per se,
harms women.' 13
The Meese Commission concluded that substantial exposure to de-
grading but non-violent pornography may lead individuals to view rape as
less serious, encourage individuals to view rape victims as more responsi-
ble for their plight, and increase the likelihood that men will say they
would force women into sexual practice.'" 4 These conclusions appear un-
warranted; available data does not indicate that harmful thoughts or be-
haviors are associated with viewing non-violent pornography."
l 5
Feminist critiques of obscenity laws, however, do cut to the essence of
the explicitness/violence issue, although from a different perspective. Ob-
scenity doctrine focuses on sexual morality.1 16 "The feminist view of por-
110. See id. (noting male supremacy is said to depend "on the ability of the
men to view women as sexual objects"); see also CATHERINE MAcKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DIscouRSES ON LIFE AND LAW 130 (1987) (noting "pornographic
meaning that the woman is defined as to be acted upon, a sexual object, a sexual
thing-the viewing is an act, an act of male supremacy").
111. SeeJOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 261-348
(John M. Robson ed., 1984) (noting that if women may not choose to assume
subservient, caretaking role without threat of compulsion from men).
112. For a further discussion of the scientific evidence on pornography, see
supra notes 74-106 and accompanying text.
113. See DONNERSTEIN, supra note 90, at 171 (noting that evidence "supporting
the contention that so-called degrading pornographic materials, as long as they are
not violent, are harmful is sparse and inconsistent. The few studies that have been
done on these materials, including our own, have yielded contradictory find-
ings."); see also HAwKINS & ZIMRING, supra note 74, at 166 (questioning findings that
violent pornography harms women due to fact that studies asserting this result
have all taken place in artificial surroundings of laboratory).
114. See MEESE COMMISSION, supra note 74, at 332 (finding that substantial
exposure to degrading, non-violent material is likely to increase extent to which
those exposed view rape as less serious, victims as more responsible and offenders
as less responsible).
115. See Linz, supra note 76, at 951 (comparing study results with those of
previous researchers). Zillman & Bryant found that exposure to these materials
changed an individual's perception of the rape victim, but later studies have not
replicated these findings. See Linz, supra note 92, at 760, 766 (noting findings of
Zillman and failure to replicate findings in present study). Additionally, Zillman's
study relied on excerpts from an X-rated film, whereas the disconfirming studies
used full feature presentations. See id. at 760 (describing methods).
116. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (noting obscenity's
"slight social value" that is "clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality"); William K. Layman, Note, Violent Pornography and the Obscenity Doctrine:
The Road Not Taken, 75 GEO. L.J. 1475, 1477 (1987) ("[T]he Court has assumed
that regulation of obscene materials is justified to prevent harm to society's morals
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nography, in contrast, 'focuses on the woman depicted and on whether
the depiction encourages men to believe that the woman experiences sex-
ual pleasure through brutalization or degradation." ' 117 By focusing on
the violent aspect of pornography rather than the depiction of sexual ex-
plicitness and morality, feminist critics are also focusing their attack on
those forms of pornography that have been scientifically proven to have a
demonstrably negative impact.' 18
C. Early Eroticization
Pornography is said to contribute to the premature sexualization of
children." 9 Due to the ethical restraints prohibiting experimental re-
search on children, there is little scientific information on pornography's
effects on children. The Johnson Commission study indicated that retro-
spective reports indicate that adult males had extensive experience with
erotica as adolescents. 1 20 The most common source of such exposure was
sharing of sexually explicit magazines or books from a friend about the
same age, where materials were passed about in a social, rather than
predominantly sexual, situation.1 2 1
Children are sexual beings from birth. 12 2 The issue of early eroticiza-
tion raises the question of what can be considered "normal" development
... ."); see also Catherine A. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
321, 322-23 (1984) (noting obscenity law is concerned with morality from male
point of view, meaning male dominance); DanielJ. McDonald, Comment, Regulat-
ing Sexually Oriented Businesses: The Regulatory Uncertainties of a "Regime of Prohibition
by Indirection" and the Obscenity Doctrine's Communal Solution, 1997 BYU L. REv. 339,
341 (1997) (advocating local determination of obscenity as preferred to judicial
determinations intended to "preserve morality of society"). But see Edward A. Carr,
Feminism, Pornography, and the First Amendment: An Obscenity-Based Analysis of Pro-
posed Antipornography Laws, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1265, 1288 (1987) (arguing that femi-
nist view of obscenity doctrine as abstract moral issue is inaccurate and
underestimates protection of Miller v. California).
117. Carr, supra note 116, at 1304 (arguing for compromise between free
speech and protection of women through antipornography ordinances).
118. See generally Layman, supra note 116, at 1475 (discussing scientific evi-
dence on violent pornography). For a further discussion of the scientific findings
on the association between violence and pornography, see supra notes 74-106 and
accompanying text.
119. See Cyberporn, supra note 4, at 114 (statement of Dee Jepsen, Executive
Director, Enough is Enough Campaign) (discussing recent Prime Time television
program on children and sex, starkly revealing that children 10 and younger are
being 'sexualized' due to constant exposure to sexually oriented materials).
120. SeeJOHNSON COMMISSION, supra note 76, at 20 (indicating "experience
with erotica during adolescence was not isolated but rather both extensive and
intensive").
121. See id. at 21 (finding that "this exposure occurs in a social situation where
materials are freely passed around .... The experience seems to be more a social
than a sexual one").
122. See generally Floyd M. Martinson, Eroticism in Infancy and Childhood, in
CHILDREN AND SEX: NEW FINDINGS, NEw PERSPECrwES 23 (Larry L. Constantine &
Floyd M. Martinson eds., 1981) (noting number of scholars documented presence
of sexual behavior in infants and in children). Martinson notes that by the age of
[Vol. 44: p. 745
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of erotic interests. In cultures where sexual activities are supported and
valued, children are exposed to sexual activities throughout their lives.
123
In non-restrictive environments, children often seek out age-mates for sex-
ual interaction, and most have had non-coercive genital intercourse by age
five or six. 124 Within American culture, prior to the Industrial Revolution,
people routinely married and gave birth in their teenage years. 125 Some
argue that not only are children sexual beings, but children also have an
affirmative right to sexual development. 126 Similarly, although society val-
ues sexually proficient spouses, current culture does not take affirmative
steps to encourage adolescents to develop both the values and the skills
necessary for a satisfactory marriage.' 2 7
In addition, the sexual rights of children are rarely taken seriously.'
2 8
Children, and especially adolescents, are naturally curious about sexual
five, children are capable of autoerotic stimulation. See id. at 25 (noting children
capable of self-stimulation to point of orgasm and stating that more than half of all
boys could achieve orgasm by age three or four).
123. See Richard L. Currier, Juvenile Sexuality in Global Perspective, in CHILDREN
AND SEX, supra note 122, at 13-14 (noting cultural differences in sexual behavior of
children).
124. See Bennett M. Berger, Liberating Child Sexuality: Commune Experiences, in
CHILDREN AND SEX: NEW FINDINGS, NEW PERSPECTIVES 247, 250 (Larry L. Constan-
tine & Floyd M. Martinson eds., 1981) (noting that in two of four communes,
"most children had participated in genital intercourse by age 5 or 6."). Currently,
the national average for age of first intercourse among women is around sixteen
years old. See GAIL ELIZABETH WYATT, STOLEN WOMEN: RECLAIMING OUR SEXUAL-
rry, TAKING BACK OUR LIVES 123 (1997) (discussing female sexuality); see also FLOYD
M. MARTINSON, THE SEXUAL LIFE OF CHILDREN 14 (1994) (noting that children
should be allowed normal process of eroticization, whereby child would learn
'some of the attitudes and responses that will allow him or her to function appro-
priately as an adolescent and adult"). Martinson also notes that children can be
eroticized too early. See id. at 16 (noting that children can be overeroticized for
their age and may be harmed by defining themselves in sexual terms too early in
life). Martinson does, however, note that "[t]o care for infants and children in the
tender, loving way regarded as appropriate for our society today is impossible with-
out sexually eroticizing the child to some extent." Id. at 17.
125. See Rebekah Levine Coley & P. Lindsay Chase-Lansdale, Adolescent Preg-
nancy and Parenthood: Recent Evidence and Future Directions, 53 AM. PSYCHOL. 152,
152 (1998) (noting that age of marriage has increased and "the rate of births to
teenagers is much lower now than it has been throughout much of the 20th
century").
126. See Dennis Lazure, The Child: His Development as a Sexual Being, in CHILD-
HOOD AND SEXUALITY. PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 16 (Jean-
Marc Samson ed., 1979) ("Every child has a fundamental right to sexual develop-
ment, in the same way that he has a fundamental right to life, to proper food, and
to education.").
127. See Currier, supra note 122, at 15 (noting "[e]veryone wants a spouse who
is sexually proficient, but no one wants a child who is learning how to be sexually
proficient").
128. See Larry L. Constantine, The Sexual Rights of Children: Implications of a
Radical Perspective, in CHILDREN AND SEX, supra note 122, at 255 (noting that "rarely
have the sexual rights of children been seriously considered").
1999]
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matters and seek information on this subject.129 The position that sexu-
ally explicit information is harmful to children has not been well docu-
mented in the scientific literature. 13° Until documentation of harm to
children exists, the argument that the government is justified in restricting
sexually explicit material to protect children is unsupported; therefore, it
is an unreasonable basis upon which to restrict free speech.
D. Predatory Sexual Offenses
Senator Grassley opened the Senate hearing on Children and
Cyberporn with comments about the increasing dangers to children of
abduction and sexual assault, analogizing these dangers with the dangers
of materials on the Internet. 13 1 Witnesses testified to the disturbing exam-
ples of child pornography available on the Internet.' 32 Graphic images of
bestiality, photos promoting incest or sexual displays of children for grati-
fication purposes would meet the criteria for obscenity.' 3 3 Child pornog-
raphy receives the most attention as legislators seek to protect children
from such material and to quell the actions of perpetrators of child sexual
129. SeeJOHNSON COMMISSION, supra note 76, at 29 (noting sex educators find
adolescents are interested in sexually explicit materials due to natural curiosity).
130. See MEESE COMMISSION, supra note 74, at 350 (finding that "[t] here needs
to be more research.., about the effects of exposure to pornographic material on
children"); Constantine, supra note 127, at 259 (noting "[t] here simply are no ade-
quate research studies on the effects of pornography on children"); see alsoJOHN-
SON COMMISSION, supra note 76, at 139 (concluding that empirical research "has
found no reliable evidence to date that exposure to explicit sexual material plays a
significant role in the causation of delinquent or criminal sexual behavior among
youth or adults"). But see Dial Info. Servs. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535,
1535 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that psychiatrist Park Dietz testified at preliminary
injunction hearing that even minimal exposure to indecent messages can have
damaging psychological effects on children).
131. For a further discussion of the scientific evaluation of pornography, see
supra notes 74-106 and accompanying text.
132. See Cyberporn, supra note 4, at I (noting dark forces that seek to destroy
innocence of youth are no longer stopped at door to home, but seek entry
through Internet); see also id. at 56 (statement of Barry F. Crimmins, investigative
journalist) (noting that child pornography is easily accessed). "Working both
under my own name and undercover, often with a profile that clearly stated I was
12 years old, I have been sent over 1,000 pornographic photographs of children."
Id.; see id. at 115 (statement of Dee Jepsen) (describing child pornography on
Internet).
133. See 141 CONG. REc. S8330 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Exon) ("It is not an exaggeration to say that.., repulsive pornography is only a
few clicks away from any child with a computer. I am not talking just about Play-
boy and Penthouse magazines .... those magazines pale in offensiveness with the
other things that are readily available."); Cyberporn, supra note 4, at 55 (statement
of Barry F. Crimmins) (describing chat rooms promoting child sexual abuse, in-
cest, bestiality and rape); see also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990) (not-
ing that "evidence suggests that pedophiles use child pornography to seduce other
children into sexual activity") (citing THE ATroRNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON
PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 649).
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offenses. 134 Sexual offenders may use child pornography to entice chil-
dren in to participating in illicit, sexual activities. 135 Protecting children
from sexual abuse is a serious and virtuous cause worthy of Congressional
attention; the problem is, however, not without other remedies.13 6 Such
images are currently prohibited by criminal laws, and the Court has specif-
ically defined these images as obscenity. 137
The Ferber Court set forth specific reasons why child pornography
should not receive First Amendment protection. 138 The primary harm of
child pornography was the child's sexual performance recorded in the
pornography. 139 Eliciting sexual behavior from children by adults is
criminalized in every state through a combination of state and federal law,
thus further regulation of this form of speech is consistent with criminal
law.1 40 In Ferber, the Court also concluded that secondary harm to the
134. See 141 CONG. Ric. S8330 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Exon) (describing Exon-Coats refinement of CDA, the purpose of which was to
make information superhighway "a little bit safer for families and children to travel
.... Delay only serves those who would endanger the Nation's children").
135. See MEESE COMMISSION, supra note 74, at 411 ("There is substantial evi-
dence that photographs of children engaged in sexual activity are used as tools for
further molestation of other children.").
136. See 141 CONG. REc. S8342 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (letter from Kent
Markus, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, to Senator
Leahy) (detailing objections to CDA).
137. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1464-1465 (1994) (criminalizing transmission of obscen-
ity to both children and adults); 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (1994) (The Protection of Chil-
dren Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 as amended) (criminalizing child
pornography); 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1994) (criminalizing interstate transportation, re-
ceipt, distribution or reproduction of visual depictions of minors engaged in sexu-
ally explicit conduct); Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111 (holding that state may
constitutionally proscribe possession and viewing of child pornography even within
privacy of one's own home); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (noting
child pornography did not receive first amendment protections); see also Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 878 n.44 (1997) (noting government expressed its view to
Congress during CDA deliberations that "the law was unnecessary because existing
laws already authorized its ongoing efforts to prosecute obscenity, child pornogra-
phy and child solicitation"); 141 CONG. REc. S8343 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (let-
ter from Kent Markus, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of
Justice, to Senator Leahy) (noting criminal division's aggressive efforts to investi-
gate and prosecute distribution of child pornography).
One commentator has written a scathing critique of the Meese Commission's
findings and argued that the Meese Commission exploited the notion of harm to
children through child pornography without evidence. See PHILIP NOBiLE & ERic
NADLER, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS. SEX 133 (1986) (stating that although po-
lice were invited to testify about "their best kiddie-porn busts," police admitted that
"tough laws had already forced the hideous product off the open market"). The
commentator also noted that "FBI Director William Webster told the commission
that his bureau did not require any new laws." Id.
138. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764 (setting forth reasons for limitations on First
Amendment protection of child pornography).
139. See id. at 759 (describing first harm of child pornography is initial sex act
performed by or with child who is filmed, thus creating pornographic image).
140. See id. at 758 (noting presence of statutes criminalizing child pornogra-
phy); see also United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 64 (1994) (find-
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child occurs when those images are circulated and cause the child further
embarrassment.1 4 1 The Court reasoned that the economic incentives in
the production of child pornography encouraged violation of the criminal
law and produced a product whose value as free speech was modest; there-
fore restriction of child pornography was appropriate. 14 2 The Court ex-
panded its restriction of child pornography in 1990 when it upheld an
Ohio statute prohibiting the possession of child pornography in the
home.1 43 This case overruled a prior case that protected the right to pos-
sess adult pornography within the privacy of one's home. 144 Thus, the
issue of child pornography has been resolved; it is considered obscenity
and receives no protection from the First Amendment. 145 Allowing chil-
dren unrestricted access to indecent speech does not diminish the restric-
tions on child pornography implemented by the Court or by federal or
state legislatures. The rhetoric of the CDA confounds child pornography,
which has been judicially determined to have cognizable harm, with sexu-
ally explicit material in general.
1 46
ing defendant guilty of violating District of Columbia's Protection of Children
Against Sexual Exploitation Act); United States v. Carroll, 105 F.3d 740, 741 (1st
Cir. 1997) (finding defendant guilty of having taken and being in possession of
photographs of his niece in lingerie and with sex toys (under 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (a)
(1994)); United States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d 533, 534 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding
defendant guilty of possession of child pornography under federal statute); People
v. Barrows, 677 N.Y.S.2d 672, 688 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (finding defendant guilty of pro-
moting obscene sexual performance by minor through email chat room).
141. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759 (noting second harm of child pornography is
circulation of image, which may cause embarrassment for child in future); see also
Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111 ("The pornography's continued existence causes the child
victims continuing harm by haunting the children in years to come."). The Court
notes that passing laws, such as Ohio's, that prohibit possession of child pornogra-
phy encourages the destruction of these materials, thus decreasing continuing
harm to child victims. See id. (noting deterrent value of prohibiting child
pornography).
142. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762 ("The value of permitting live performances
and photographic reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is
exceedingly modest, if not de minimus."); see also Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109 (noting
Ohio statute at issue was enacted "in order to protect the victims of child pornogra-
phy; it hopes to destroy a market for the exploitative use of children").
143. See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111 (holding that "[g]iven the gravity of the
State's interest ... we find that Ohio may constitutionally proscribe the possession
and viewing of child pornography"). For a further discussion of privacy rights in-
volved, see generallyJohn Quigley, Child Pornography and the Right to Privacy, 43 FLA.
L. REv. 347 (1991) (discussing intersection of Osborne and Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557 (1969)).
144. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565 ("Whatever may be the justifications for other
statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy of one's
own home.").
145. See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 125 (finding defendant Osborne's First Amend-
ment arguments unpersuasive); Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765 (noting that prohibition of
child pornography did not violate First Amendment liberties).
146. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759 (discussing harm of child pornography); Linz,
supra note 92, at 766-67 (finding no harmful effects from sexually explicit, non-
violent pornography).
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E. Potential Benefits of Availability of Sexually Explicit Information
Sexually explicit speech may not only not be harmful to children, but
there are occasions where freedom of expression may actually serve chil-
dren's best interests. One of the most obvious and frequently cited exam-
ples is that of education. 147 Children need to be educated about their
bodies in their entirety, including their genitalia, or "private parts."
148 If
discussion of private parts are excluded from general discussions and edu-
cation, children may develop negative feelings about their bodies, which
could inhibit the development of healthy sexuality in adulthood. 149 In
fact, current treatment and prevention programs for child sexual abuse-
the evil Congress would seek to quell by its actions-promote the use of
"doctors names" for private parts, anatomically correct drawings and frank
discussions with children to promote children's abilities to openly discuss
their sexuality with adults.1 50 These actions are taken under the theory
that if children have both the vocabulary and knowledge that their care-
takers are interested in hearing about all parts of their bodies, it will be
easier for children to "tell" if ever they are touched in a sexually inappro-
147. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 878 (1997) (discussing how, under
CDA, parents could not email their college student relevant information on birth
control); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 (1972) (providing example of medi-
cal education as permissible and constitutionally protected use of sexually explicit
material); see also Complaint, supra note 4, at *18-19 (describing how CDA would
proscribe Critical Path's safer sex instructions written deliberately in "street lan-
guage" to facilitate understanding by adolescents).
148. See ETHER DEBLINGER & ANNE HOPE HEFLIN, TREATING SEXUALLY ABUSED
CHILDREN AND THEIR NON-OFFENDING PARENTS: A COGNITIVE BEHAVIORAL AP-
PROACH 151 (1996) (noting that "[a] ge-appropriate sex education is important for
all children"). The authors discuss problems of sexually transmitted diseases and
teen pregnancy as issues that may be better addressed with sex education and open
parent-child communication. See id.. Children need to have the necessary vocabu-
lary to discuss and disclose sexual abuse, therefore, it is important for children to
learn words for all their body parts, including sex organs. See id. at 107; see also
Anne Welbourne-Moglia, Sex Education, in THE MEESE COMMISSION EXPOSED 12-13
(National Coalition Against Censorship ed., 1986) (recalling her testimony before
Commission on Pornography, advocating that "real clear and present danger is
ignorance" of bodies, and confusion about sexuality).
149. See Joseph H. Beitchman et al., A Review of the Long-Term Effects of Child
Sexual Abuse, 16 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 101, 115 (1992) (noting that women with
history of untreated CSA [child sexual abuse] demonstrate more evidence of sex-
ual disturbance or dysfunction); see also Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758 n.9 (noting "sexually
exploited children are unable to develop healthy affectionate relationships in later
life [and] have sexual dysfunctions").
150. See generally DEBLINGER & HEFLIN, supra note 148 (providing rationale for
sexual education in treatment of sexually abused children); see also LoWe STAUFFER,
CENTER FOR CHILDREN'S SUPPORT CHILDREN'S GROUP MANUAL Session 5, 21 (noting
"[t]he purposes of tonight's activities are to help children learn the proper names
for their body parts-both private and public-and to help children feel more
comfortable talking about their private parts and sexual issues in general"). Sexu-
ally explicit material is similarly used in treatment of adults with sexual dysfunc-
tion. See Maurice Yaffe, Therapeutic Uses of Sexually Explicit Material, in THE
INFLUENCE OF PORNOGRAPHY ON BEHAVIOR 119-50 (Maurice Yaffe & Edward C. Nel-
son, eds. 1982) (discussing use of sexually explicit information in treatment).
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priate manner. 151 Alerting a caretaker of inappropriate sexual touching
facilitates the caretakers ability to provide protection and guidance.
152
Thus, sexual explicitness is necessary for sexual education. 153 The Meese
Commission has stated that portrayals of sexuality outside of sex and mar-
riage has a corruptive influence. 154 This argument has been used to jus-
tify the suppression of certain sexual education information. 15 5 This
argument, however, is flawed, as it has been demonstrated that exposure
151. See DEBLINGER & HEFLIN, supra note 148, at 151 (noting four reasons why
sex education is especially important for sexually abused children: it corrects mis-
conceptions about sex that may have resulted from their abusive experiences, it
may reduce child's vulnerability to further abuse, premature sexual activity or
adult sexual dysfunction, it provides gradual exposure as treatment intervention,
and through sex education, adults can model for children how sexual issues can be
addressed calmly and without excessive embarrassment). Children may not tell
that they are being abused if "[t]hey do not have the language to do so." Id. at
132.
152. See id. at 110 (noting that alerting caretakers permits caretakers to take
protective action).
153. See Complaint, supra note 4, at *21 (describing Planned Parenthood Fed-
eration of America's effort toward educating minors on subjects such as "abortion,
contraception, prevention of sexually transmitted infections, and sexuality").
PPFA notes that it responds with "complete information." Id. The site specifically
utilizes vernacular terminology so that information will be accessible to minors
who seek it. See id. (noting that PPFA uses terms like "cum" for ejaculation so that
minors will be able to comprehend material).
154. See MEESE COMMISSION, supra note 74, at 339 (noting that "it is far from
implausible to hypothesize that materials depicting sexual activity without mar-
riage, love, commitment, or affection bear some causal relationship to sexual activ-
ity without marriage, love, commitment, or affection").
155. See, e.g., Capitol Enters., Inc. v. Chicago, 260 F.2d 670, 676 (7th Cir.
1958) (reversing district court finding that sex education film was obscene);
Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F.2d 511 (D.D.C. 1945) (granting injunction to prevent
defendant from refusing to carry pamphlet on family planning services). The Act
for the Suppression of Trade in, and Circulation of Obscene Literature and Arti-
cles of Immoral Use, also known as the Comstock Act, in effect from 1873-1971,
was used to suppress information about contraception and abortion. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1461-1462; 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1994) (proscribing speech related to abortion).
Information on birth control has historically been subject to proscription by ob-
scenity laws. See Bill Baird, The Politics of God, Government and Sex: A Thirty-One Year
Crusade, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 139, 147-48 (1993) (discussing author's per-
sonal history of being fined and jailed for display of obscene objects (birth control
devices) in teaching indigent about birth control); Margaret Blanchard, The Ameri-
can Urge to Censor: Freedom of Expression Versus the Desire to Sanitize Society-From
Anthony Comstock to 2 Live Crew, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 741, 745 (1992) (discussing
historical censorship of information on birth control); Michael Kent Curtis, "Free
Speech" and its Discontents: The Rebellion Against General Propositions and the Danger of
Discretion, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 419, 421 (1996) (discussing historical practice of
using judicial discretion to suppress speech of women teaching about birth con-
trol); David M. Rabban, The Free Speech League, The ACLU, and Changing Conceptions
of Free Speech in American History, 45 STAN. L. REv. 47, 57-58 (1992) (describing final
act of Anthony Comstock's censorship career as helping secure arrest and prosecu-
tion of Margaret Sanger's husband for distribution of her famous pamphlet on
birth control, Family Limitations); Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Critique of "The" Fem-
inist Critique of Pornography, 79 VA. L. REv. 1099, 1169 (1993) ("[T]hose who seek to
repress women's rights consistently have used censorship as their tool."); see also
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to information on sexual education and birth control does not increase
teenage sexual activity nor teenage pregnancy. 156 Finally, the Court has
reasoned that the right to free speech necessarily includes the right to
receive information, and that "the State may not, consistently with the
spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available
knowledge.' 57
If these materials promoting healthy sexuality are made available to
children in print, they should also be available on-line. 158 The Internet is
a vast resource of information, and some children, especially older adoles-
cents, may seek out sexually explicit material both out of normal curiosity
and a quest for knowledge. 159 The Internet is also an exceptional re-
source in that it is widely available to persons of diverse income levels and
is available to both private subscribers and through public institutions. 160
Because discussions of sexuality are taboo in American culture,16 1 they
FRANK McCOURT, ANGELA'S ASHES 347-49 (1996) (describing orders of government
to remove page from magazine advertising condoms).
156. SeeDEBLINGER & HEFLIN, supra note 148, at 155 ("Open parent communi-
cation about sexuality does not appear to be associated with either increased or
decreased adolescent sexual activity. However, among sexually active teenagers,
those who communicate openly with parents are more likely to use contraception,
thereby decreasing their risk of experiencing unintentional pregnancy and/or suf-
fering sexually transmitted diseases.") (citations omitted); see also Coley & Chase-
Lansdale, supra note 125, at 161 (noting that one of most successful programs
"incorporated comprehensive medical care and contraceptive services, social serv-
ices, and parenting education .... This program postponed the age of sexual
onset; increased contraception use; reduced the frequency of sex; and.., reduced
the [teen] pregnancy rate by 30%").
157. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (noting that informa-
tion on birth control is constitutionally protected under right to free speech); see
also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 439 (1971) (extending this right to unmar-
ried minors).
158. See 141 CONG. Rc. S8335 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Feingold) (noting material proscribed by CDA with "the same material, the same
message would be perfectly legal, and fully protected by the Constitution, in a
bookstore, or a library").
159. SeeJOHNSON COMMISSION, supra note 76, at 29 (noting that "[a] large
majority of sex educators and counselors are of the opinion that most adolescents
are interested in explicit sexual materials, and that this interest is a product of
natural curiosity about sex."); see also Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S.
491, 507 (1985) (invalidating Washington statute that prohibited material inciting
lust). The Court in Brockett noted that material that arouses normal sexual re-
sponses is "not without constitutional protection." Id. at 501; see Mary C. Dunlap,
Sexual Speech and the State: Putting Pornography in its Place, 17 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REv. 359, 361 (1987) (arguing sexual speech, including sexual education for mi-
nors on issues of child abuse, pregnancy, heterosexuality and alternatives, AIDS
and contraception, deserves greater protection than provided by Supreme Court
in Miller).
160. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997) ("Anyone with access to the
Internet may take advantage of a wide variety of communication and information
retrieval methods."). Access is widely available through colleges, corporations,
community libraries and commercial computer coffee shops. See id. at 2334-35.
161. See MARTINSON, supra note 124, at 13 (noting inhibitory, punitive and
moralistic attitudes of parents contribute to sexual dysfunction in their children).
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flourish under more taboo forms of expression, such as indecency and
obscenity. 162 The Internet provides a more anonymous format for ex-
change of information. 163 This anonymity may encourage persons who
are embarrassed about sexual matters to seek information they would not
otherwise have access to. 1 6 4 Thus, the Internet may be an ideal outlet for
both adults and children to receive information on sexuality and has been
utilized for this purpose by Planned Parenthood and Critical Path. 165
The difficulty in discussing matters of sexuality arises as a result of
differing value judgments within our culture. As the Court in Miller aptly
stated, a national standard for obscenity cannot be drawn, nor can it be set
as a matter of law. 166 This question has been delegated to the jury as a
question of fact. 16 7 Some material on the Internet is undoubtedly not
suitable viewing material for young children; however, if it does not meet
the criteria for obscenity and consequently, regulation, the government
should not be permitted to suppress it.168 Parents are the most suitable
See generally SIGMUND FREUD, TOTEM AND TABOO: SOME POINTS OF AGREEMENT BE-
TWEEN THE MENTAL LIVES OF SAVAGES AND NEUROTICS (James Strachey trans., 1989)
(1913) (discussing internal conflict created by libidinal desires and social inhibi-
tory factors).
162. SeeJOHNSON COMMISSION, supra note 76, at 29 (finding that sex educators
feel "if adolescents had access to adequate information regarding sex, through
appropriate sex education, their interest in pornography would be reduced.
There is mounting evidence of dissatisfaction with existing sources of sex
information.").
163. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 4, at *17 (describing availability of infor-
mation on Internet in anonymous format).
164. SeeJOHNSON COMMISSION, supra note 76, at 30 (finding that children are
dissatisfied with sex education at home or at school and noting that parents are
frequently "embarrassed or uninformed and most do not talk openly and honestly
about sex").
165. See Complaint, supra note 4, at *17 (describing AEGIS's concern that
information it publishes on HIV and AIDS be available anonymously). It stated:
Many people, including people who fear that they may be infected with
HIV/AIDS, use AEGIS to get information about the disease because they
can do so anonymously. AEGIS does not want to screen to prevent mi-
nors from gaining access to its resources because such screening would
infringe upon the privacy and anonymity of all users of the system.
Id.; see William Adams, But Do You Have to Tell My Parents? The Dilemma for Minors
Seeking HIV Testing and Treatment, 27J. MARSHALL L. REV. 493, 494 (1994) (describ-
ing prevalence of HIV in adolescent population and arguing for need of facilitated
availability of testing and treatment).
166. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1972) ("[Olur Nation is simply
too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that such [obscenity]
standards could be articulated for all 50 States in a single formulation, even assum-
ing the prerequisite consensus exists.").
167. See id. at 30 (holding that determinations of what appeals to prurient
interest or is patently offensive are essentially questions of fact); see also Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 873 (1997) (noting that Courts would be unable to give legal
limitation to CDA because of Millers rationale that such judgments are "essentially
ones of fact").
168. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (setting forth right to free speech); Reno, 521
U.S. at 873 (protecting right to indecent speech on Internet); Miller, 413 U.S. at
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persons to determine what is appropriate viewing material for their chil-
dren, and parents have a fundamental liberty interest in providing this
guidance, absent governmental interference.1 69
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF CHILDREN'S FREE
SPEECH ON-LINE
Governmental regulation is not necessary to limit children's exposure
to indecent speech on-line. The most obvious alternative to governmental
interference is allowing parents the right to parent their children. A sec-
ond option is utilizing Internet-blocking technology.
A. Substantive Due Process Parental Child Rearing Authority
The Court has long recognized a parent's right to raise his or her
child without undue governmental interference. 170 The Reno Court reit-
erated this right in distinguishing the constitutional protection of Ginsberg
from the unconstitutional overreach of the CDA.17 1 This right necessarily
extends to the right of parents to select what their child views on the
Internet. 1
72
The level of sexually explicit material to which children are exposed
and the age at which they are exposed is viewed as an arena not for gov-
ernmental proscription, but for parental guidance. 173 Absent a conclusive
demonstration of harm from exposure to sexually explicit materials, par-
24-25 (permitting suppressing of obscene speech and protecting speech that is not
obscene).
169. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("[C]are and nur-
ture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.").
170. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (holding that
compulsory public school attendance policy infringed on parental rights to opt for
private education for their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923)
(invalidating state statute that prohibited teaching German language in public
schools because statute unconstitutionally interfered with parents rights to raise
their children without state interference).
171. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 866 (noting that Ginsberg did not bar parents from
purchasing obscene materials for their children if they so desired and that
"[u]nder the CDA, by contrast, neither the parents' consent-nor even their par-
ticipation-in the communication would avoid the application of the statute").
172. See id. at 864 (assigning determination of what child views on Internet to
responsibility of parents); see also Dawn L. Johnson, It's 1996: Do You Know Where
Your Cyberkids Are? Captive Audiences and Content Regulation on the Internet, 15J. MAR-
SHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 51, 97 (1996) (arguing that parents should block
offensive content on Internet utilizing blocking technology and governmental reg-
ulation is inappropriate).
173. See Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 130 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (Wald, Tatel & Rogers, J., dissenting) ("While we accept that the govern-
ment may have a compelling interest in protecting children from indecent pro-
gramming, we agree with Judge Edwards that interest must be pursued in the
context of helping parents to make viewing choices for their children as to the
programming they watch inside the home.").
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ents should not be pre-empted from determining what is most suitable for
their children and can be charged with determining the fine line between
what is to be considered a legitimate educational, artistic or other objec-
tive, and what should be screened from children's experience.1 74
The state has reserved its interference with the substantive due pro-
cess and privacy rights inherent in parenting and family life to only those
issues that pose a compelling interest. 175 The Court determined that in-
culcating the value of nationalism was not significant enough to permit
governmental interference in the parental right to determine suitable ed-
ucation for their children. 176 Ensuring a child's physical safety, however,
is a sufficiently compelling interest to permit state intervention and
interference. 1
77
The Court has also upheld parental child rearing authority when it
coincides with other fundamental rights, such as freedom of religion. 178
The instant example is directly analogous, permitting parents to provide
supervision and guidance for children's Internet use involves two funda-
mental rights, parental child rearing authority and freedom of speech. 179
174. SeeGinsberg v. NewYork, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1967) (noting that statute at
issue "expressly recognizes the parental role in assessing sex-related material harm-
ful to minors .... Moreover, the prohibition against sales to minors does not bar
parents who so desire from purchasing the magazines for their children"); see also
Alliance, 56 F.3d at 127 (noting section 10b of Cable Television Consumer Protec-
tion Act "does what petitioners say, but it does so for a particular, and for a consti-
tutionally permissible reason-to protect children and to enhance the ability of
parents to shield their children from the influence of 'adult' programming"). The
court in Alliance stated that:
In my view, my right as a parent has been preempted, not facilitated, if I
am told that certain programming will be banned from my cable televi-
sion. Congress cannot take away my right to decide what my children
watch, absent some showing that my children are in fact at risk of harm
from exposure to indecent programming.
Id. at 145-46 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
175. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (finding right to "estab-
lish a home and bring up children" is fundamental liberty interest, which can be
overriden only by compelling state interest).
176. See id. at 401 (noting purpose of legislation at issue was to "promote civic
development .... [T] he State may do much . . . to improve the quality of its
citizens . . . but the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be
respected").
177. See generally Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, amending Federal
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (1994) (not-
ing that children may be removed from parent's care for abuse or neglect); see also
In re Green, 292 A.2d 387, 393 (1972) (noting that State may intervene to provide
medical care, in this case, blood transfusion, to child absent consent of parent if
child's life is threatened).
178. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972) (holding Amish fami-
lies right to freedom of religion and parental child rearing without government
interference trumped State's interest in educating its youth past eighth grade).
179. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (protecting fundamental
right to free speech); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (finding
parents have fundamental right to raise their children); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399
(finding parental right to raise children without undue governmental interference
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Therefore, the state's interest must withstand strict scrutiny to surmount
and supersede these two fundamental constitutional rights. 180 The state's
interest in suppressing potentially objectionable speech to protect chil-
dren, although well-intentioned, simply does not rise to the level of scru-
tiny to justify sweeping restrictions such as the CDA. 18 1
B. Internet Blocking Technology
The CDA offers a safe haven for persons who used reasonably effec-
tive methods to restrict children's access to obscene and indecent speech
on-line. 182 The legislative history also indicates a reliance on Internet-
blocking technology to restrict appropriately children's access to indecent
speech on-line without unduly circumscribing constitutionally permissible
speech for adults.183 Although such software is desirable and is en-
couraged by marketplace demand, the state of the art in Internet-blocking
technology is not sufficiently advanced to support the regulation of a fun-
damental right. 18 4
The use of blocking technology with television is analogous to the
usefulness of this technology on the Internet. The merits of such blocking
technology with television, known as the V-chip or C-chip, have been de-
bated in prior legislation and ensuing litigation on control of violence and
sexual explicitness on cable television. 185 Although this technology does
exist, neither the Court nor the legislature have critically analyzed the ef-
fectiveness of this option. 186 Such technology is not currently widespread
is fundamental liberty interest); see alsoJoseph W. Ozmer II, Note, Who's Raising the
Kids: The Exclusion of Parental Authority in Condom Distribution at Public Schools, 30
GA. L. REV. 887, 889-90 (1996) (arguing parental consent is vital in condom distri-
bution program because of fundamental parental right to direct upbringing of
their children).
180. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233 (holding that "interests of parenthood ... com-
bined with a free exercise claim" are sufficient to defeat State interest in compul-
sory education).
181. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 882 (noting that "CDA places an unacceptably heavy
burden on protected speech, and that the defenses do not constitute the sort of
,narrow tailoring"' necessary to justify restricting fundamental rights under strict
scrutiny analysis).
182. See 47 U.S.C. § 223(e) (1994) (allowing affirmative defenses for those
who take "good faith, reasonable, effective and appropriate actions" to restrict ac-
cess to minors, and those who restrict access to covered materials by requiring
proof of age such as verified credit card, adult identification number or code).
183. See 141 CONG. REc. S8330 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Leahy) (arguing for parental guidance through use of software "that can allow
parents to know what their children see on the Internet").
184. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 882 (noting "the District Court correctly refused to
rely on unproven future technology to save the statute").
185. See Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 120 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (describing cable operator's option of installing lockboxes, which could be
unblocked, giving access to indecent programming, at viewer's request).
186. See id. at 138 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (noting ineffectiveness of lockbox
has never been demonstrated). "[T] he government has notably failed to build any
record that parental control of children's television viewing is not reliable by itself
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in use, nor does it possess a sufficient level of precision to justify balancing
First Amendment rights upon technology.18 7
Blocking technology on the Internet is presently available, and the
market for it is fueling development of new software.18 8 Internet-blocking
technology is similar to the V-chip, although it is still developing and thus
not sufficiently advanced to justify balancing First Amendment rights
based upon it.18 9 Technology is available to screen out predetermined
sites or certain suggestive words, however, it cannot screen sexually ex-
plicit images. 190 In fact, the United States District Court for the District of
New Mexico found as a fact that "[t]here are no good faith, reasonable,
effective and appropriate actions available to restrict or prevent access by
minors to communications by speakers [using the internet] . .. ."191 Due
to the imprecision in the screening technology, blocking technology may
screen out sites that are not obscene, indecent or even offensive, thus sup-
pressing protected and non-harmful speech. 192
and must be supplemented or even overidden by a government censor." Id.; see id.
at 140 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (discussing potential advantages of use of lock boxes
for those who wish to self-limit their own exposure to indecent speech); Sable
Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 130 (1989) (discussing implementation of
technologically-based regulations regarding blocks for Dial-A-Porn on telephones).
The Court in Sable noted that:
[T]he congressional record presented to us contains no evidence as to
how effective or ineffective the FCC's most recent regulations were or
might prove to be .... No Congressman or Senator purported to present
a considered judgement with respect to how often or to what extent mi-
nors could or would circumvent the rules and have access to dial-a-porn
messages.
Id.
187. See generally Diana M. Zuckerman, Media Violence, Gun Control, and Public
Policy, 66 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 388 (1996) (arguing that due to expense and
rarity, "technologies such as the C-chip would probably take years to have a sub-
stantial impact nationwide").
188. See Cyberporn, supra note 4, at 11 (prepared remarks of Sen. Patrick J.
Leahy, Vermont) ("We are finding that software entrepreneurs and the vibrant
forces of the free market are providing tools that can empower parents to restrict
their children's access to offensive material. We can address the problem of online
pornography by empowering parents, not the government, to screen children's
computer activities."); see also Reno, 521 U.S. at 855 (discussing available forms of
Internet-blocking technology and indicating that some forms block sites and some
forms block text); Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto,
63 U. CHI. L. REv. 937, 937 (1996) (noting Supreme Court has assigned value
development of children as properly within purview of their parents).
189. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 881-82 (noting that presently available technology
does not permit reliance or "narrowly tailored" restrictions on fundamental right
of free speech).
190. See id. at 854 (citing findings of fact by district court).
191. ACLU v. Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1031 (D.N.M. 1998).
192. See Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of the Loudoun County
Library, 2 F. Supp. 2d 783, 787 (E.D. Va. 1998) (noting that use of "X-Stop"
software at public library blocked access "to protected speech such as the Quaker
Home Page, the Zero Population Growth website, and the site for the American
Association of University Women-Maryland").
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COMMENT
Although Internet-blocking technology is not sufficiently advanced to
justify the restriction of fundamental rights, the private use of this technol-
ogy can enhance parental supervision over children's use of the Internet,
and it is consistent with the fundamental right of parents to parent their
children. 193 Parents may block access to all chat rooms or bulletin
boards. 194 Parents may opt to screen sites based on content areas such as
violence, nudity, racism, drug-culture, gambling and alcohol. 195 Reason-
ably effective methods of screening materials parents believe to be inap-
propriate will soon be available.1 96 Individually tailored blocking
technology may better assist parents in screening content objectionable
within their particular value systems and may better tailor a program for
the needs of the particular child. 197 Some parents may be more con-
cerned about the empirically proven deleterious effects of violence than
nudity. These categories, however, may receive First Amendment protec-
tion, therefore providing guidance to children in the form of blocking the
Internet is best left to parents. 198
V. CONCLUSION
Freedom of speech is important in all modes of communication and
is protected for both adults and children. 19 9 Although politicians often
speak of the need to protect children from sexually explicit material, such
193. See Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (upholding parental right to
admit child to hospital, provided minimal due process rights afforded to child and
stating, "[o]ur jurisprudence historically has reflected Western Civilization con-
cepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children");
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (finding parental right to raise chil-
dren without undue governmental interference is fundamental liberty interest); see
also Robert B. Keiter, Privacy, Children, and Their Parents: Reflections on and Beyond
the Supreme Court's Approach, 66 MINN. L. REv. 459, 490-98 (1982) (reviewing consti-
tutional protections afforded to parents and children and family privacy and argu-
ing "intrusion is only justified under extremely exigent circumstances").
194. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (describing
finding of fact number 71), afffd 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
195. See id. at 840 (describing CyberNOT product user tailored option of
blocking user selected categories); see alsoJohnson, supra note 172, at 97 ("First,
blanket content regulation is unnecessary. Existing federal and state statutes are
sufficient to prosecute crime on the Internet, and existing technology allows par-
ents to block access to offensive content.").
196. See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 842 (describing finding of fact number 73).
197. See id. at 840 (describing product's option enabling parents to select par-
ticular types of Internet information to block).
198. See Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of the Loudoun County
Library, 2 F. Supp. 2d 783, 787 (1998) (noting use of Internet-blocking technology
blocked user access to non-obscene and constitutionally protected speech).
199. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (upholding right to inde-
cent speech on Internet); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1977) (recog-
nizing value of indecent speech, although permitting its regulation); Erznoznick v.
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (noting that censorship of public viewing of
motion pictures limited by First Amendment); Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503,
508-09 (1969) (holding that children have right to free speech).
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as the images of indecency and pornography on-line, there does not ap-
pear to be a solid body of scientific evidence upon which to base this argu-
ment. Sexually violent pornography and child pornography have been
proven harmful. Thus, these forms of expression are rightfully prohibited
by existing statutes. 20 0 The broad sweep of the CDA, and similarly pro-
posed legislation designed to protect children, however, sometimes chills
speech that is constitutionally permissible, is not harmful and may be ben-
eficial. Children take from the media what they bring to it.20 1 Children
should not be foreclosed from avenues of expression that are: (1) constitu-
tionally permissible and (2) available through other media, such as books
or magazines. 20 2 Consequently, Internet indecency should be permitted
without further governmental regulation.
Parents should be able to select appropriate educational and recrea-
tional experiences for their children without governmental interfer-
ence. 20 3 Parental supervision, including use of restrictive Internet-
blocking software, can provide guidance for children in forming judg-
ments about the information they receive. By preserving the accessibility
of free speech, the government is serving substantive due process objec-
tives and is in synchrony with scientific evidence.
Gretchen Witte
200. See 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (1994) (The Protection of Children Against Sexual
Exploitation Act of 1977 as amended) (criminalizing child pornography); 18
U.S.C. § 2252 (1994) (criminalizing interstate transportation, receipt, distribution
or reproduction of visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit
conduct).
201. See CLIFFORD ET AL., supra note 7, at 226 ("We have most strongly rein-
forced the idea that the general knowledge that a young viewer brings to the view-
ing situation is crucial in predicting what he or she will take away from it.").
202. See 141 CONG. REc. S8335 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Feingold) (expressing concern that CDA "will establish different standards for ma-
terial which appears in print and on the computer screen").
203. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 867 (noting that Court has been consistent in recog-
nition of principle that "parents' claim to authority in their own household to
direct the rearing of their children is basic to the structure of our society"). See
generally John Dayton, Free Speech, the Internet, and Educational Institutions: An Analy-
sis of Reno v. ACLU, 123 EDUC. L. REP. 997 (1998) (discussing parental guidance
over content children are exposed to on Internet).
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